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The rich nation is the novelty, and the development 
that makes entire nations rich is itself the pivotal 
development of modern history 
(Asa Briggs, British historian, 1963) 
 
Abstract 
Seen in historical perspective the main economic predicaments of the present world (such 
as poverty, inequality, backwardness) appear in a somewhat different light than in many 
current discussions, especially by sociologists, radical economists and political scientists. In 
the present paper the achievements of the modern age, and in particular of the post- World 
War II period, are considered in the perspective of economic and demographic history, and 
in their connection with the contemporary systems of production and of international 
relations. Some considerations concerning future possible developments conclude the 
paper.  
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1. Introduction and outline 
We live in a very unequal world plagued by poverty. Overall, economic progress is 
perceived as too slow, as the advance of “globalization” renders the inequalities and 
miseries of the world less tolerable than in the past. There is a widespread rejection in some 
quarters (radical economists and political scientists in particular) of the economic 
institutions of the modern world (identified under the garb of “capitalism” and 
“globalization”).1  However, from the perspective of economic history the present state of 
the world appears in a different light. A rather uncontroversial fact is that never in the 
history of mankind there have been so many paupers as in the present times. But the basic 
reason for this is that there have never been so many people around. Indeed, never in the 
history of the world has the percentage of (absolutely) poor people been so low. Moreover, 
quite recently even the absolute number of world paupers has kept decreasing. The 
preoccupation with overcoming backwardness and poverty and  lifting the poor of the 
world to a better living standard has been translated into development assistance and in the 
research of the best way to help countries to develop. But the results of development 
assistance have been by and large disappointing. Contrary to the liberal enlightened 
perspective, no easy recipe for the problem of backwardness, and for the specific one of 
the fragile states, is in sight. But, if we are looking to the post-war experience, it is fair to 
say that the continuation and intensification of the globalization process could certainly 
help. Economic inequality in the world as a whole has probably never been so high, but the 
reason is not, as sometimes hinted, that the lot of the poorer has worsened 
(“exploitation”), but the dramatic, albeit unequally distributed, economic betterment of the 
many. At the same time the propensity towards economic inequality (as captured by the 
extraction ratio, defined below) has probably never been so low in historical times. The 
green revolution and technological progress have contributed to decisively overcome the 
Malthusian trap, and to bring about an impressive demographic explosion. Indeed, never in 
the history of the world has economic and demographic growth been so rapid as after 
WWII, greatly favoured by the absence of major wars, 2 of the sort that were endemic in 
the past, and by the extraordinary expansion of international exchange. Global overall 
peace can be obviously attributed to the mutual threat of atomic destruction, but also to a 
change of perspective in international relations against the respectability of wars of 
aggression and conquest, leading to a change in the rules of the game, which was already 
attempted, but utterly failed, after the first World War. The price to pay has been the 
lingering of the world on the brink of a global nuclear catastrophe, as well as the freezing 
of frontiers and national aspirations (which have surged again with a vengeance after the 
end of the Cold War). But Malthusian traps, and different forces threatening the 
destabilization of relatively peaceful world coexistence (such as the inevitable diffusion of 
nuclear capabilities and the rise of nationalism in some quarters) are looming, with the 
                                                  
1  For a sympathetic survey of those opinions see Zolo (2007). For a confutation of all sort of widespread 
anti-globalization prejudices and conventional opinions see Bhagwati, 2007. For a forceful defence of 
capitalist globalization see Norberg (2003). 
2  This means all-out wars between major military powers. Of course there was no want of “minor” conflicts 
(for a list of them and an estimate of their presumed victims see Balint, 1996), but for relative intensity and 
proportion of victims in the global world population were apparently of much lesser importance than in 
other epochs. 
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potentiality of drawing the post-war period of overall peaceful economic and demographic 
growth eventually to a close. 
2. Poverty 
Historically world population has been increasing at a very slow pace, amounting to 
near stagnation, held in check by high mortality rates, especially of child mortality. Per 
capita incomes have been mostly at what we would regard utter poverty levels, and 
whenever they have increased they have done so at a very slow pace, amounting, in the 
very long run, to some small fraction of one percent yearly. Following the industrial 
revolution things have started radically to change. But never have world population and 
world income increased so tumultuously as after the Second World War; indeed, the 
explosion both in wealth and population in this post-war period has been an historical 
unicum. Scientifically speaking, from the perspective of the history of mankind the 
anomaly to be explained is not backwardness and poverty, but development and wealth. 
The brakes that in the previous epochs constrained the growth of world population, and 
which started to slacken following the Industrial Revolution,3 have apparently been swept 
away by the progressive lengthening in life expectancy, leading to unprecedented 
demographic growth, which has been accompanied by unprecedented economic growth. 
Still, a large part of humanity lives in appalling poverty conditions. Indeed, there 
has never been such a high number of poor people in the world as in the post WWII 
period. If conventionally (very conventionally, indeed) we define, following the World 
Bank, as (absolute) poverty a daily consumption of less that two dollars,4 their number in 
2001 was estimated as 2.7 billion,5 more than the entire world population in 1950.6 The 
number of extreme poor consuming less than one dollar a day in 2001 was reckoned to 
have been close to 1.1 billion, about the same as the entire world population in 1820 
(which may be conventionally taken as the year of the coming of age of the Industrial 
Revolution and the start of its spreading abroad); the number of the extreme poor in 
                                                  
3  Or more exactly, following the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that has led 
first to the Industrial Revolution and, subsequently, through the medical and public hygiene innovations it 
was able to conjure, to the Mortality Revolution of the second half of the nineteenth century and later, 
coinciding with the times of what has been dubbed the Second Industrial Revolution (cf. Easterlin, 1996, 
pp. 7-9, 23-29, 69 f.). 
4  Or rather 2.15 dollars a day at 1993 purchasing power (somewhat less than 800 dollars a year), 
corresponding to 2 dollars of 1985 international purchasing power. According to the World Bank definition 
1.08 dollars of 1993 purchasing power a day (somewhat less than 400 dollars a year), corresponding to 1 
dollar at 1985 international purchasing power, characterize extreme poverty. In the text we use the 
colloquially usual distinction of 1 and 2 dollars a day. (For the definition of the international poverty line see 
World Bank, 2005, table 2.5, “Poverty”, http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm#definition; 
see also UNPD, 2007, p. 367). Recently the World Bank has updated its definitions following a revised and 
extended appraisal of PPP exchange rates. We shall deal with these issues in the next section. 
5  Source: Word Bank (2005), table 2.5 “Poverty”, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2005/Table2_5.htm. 
It should be noted that there has been actually a decrease (estimated at about 400 million) in the number of 
the extreme poor (less than 1$ a day) during the 20 years from 1981 to 2001, but only because of the 
reduction of extreme poverty in China. Some further decrease in the amount of the less extreme poor 
seems to be happening in the more recent years. For some recent discussion on world poverty estimates 
and some updating, see Chen and Ravaillon (2004) and (2007) and Ravaillon, Chen and Sangraula (2007), as 
well as World Bank (2009).  
6  See Table 1. We refer to the World Bank data as the most authoritative, even by no means uncontroversial, 
source. The accuracy of World Bank data has been challenged in particular by Bhalla (2002) who estimates a 
significantly lower number of absolute poor and a much faster decrease in poverty in the two decades of 
accelerated globalization, between 1980 and 2000.  
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previous years is estimated to have been even higher, about 1.5 billion around 1980 (before 
the recent tumultuous growth of the economy of China). Most of them are concentrated in 
third world countries, but a few millions are living in (and a number of them leaving from) 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the so called transition countries). 7 See the data in the 
following tables: 
 
Table 1. Number of people living with less than 2$ a day (millions)  
Region 1981 2005 
East Asia & Paciﬁc 1,278 728 
of which China 972 473 
Europe & Central Asiaa 35 41 
Latin America & Caribbean  89 94 
\Middle East & North Africa 46 51 
South Asia 799 1,09 
Sub-Saharan Africa 291 555 
Total 2538 2560 
Excluding China 1,566 2,142 
Source: Word Bank (2009), table 2.8, P.70.  
a66 in 1999. 
 
Table 2. Number of people living with less than 1 ,25$ a day (millions) 
Region 1981 2005 
East Asia & Paciﬁc 1072 316 
 China 835 208 
Europe & Central Asiaa 7 17 
Latin America & Caribbean 47 45 
Middle East & North Africa 14 11 
South Asia 548 596 
Sub-Saharan Africa 211 388 
Total 1,898 1,165 
Excluding China 1063 877 
Source: as in the table above.  
a24 in 1999 
2.1 Poverty and transition  
It is notable that the number of the poor in transition countries as a whole has 
reached a peak in 1999, just a visible sign of the hardship engendered by the transition 
process during the nineties, but since then it has started to decrease. The same applies to 
the percentage of the poor in the population.8 The dynamics of the poverty rates is just a 
manifestation of the overall costs of transition, as borne out by the dynamics of national 
income and, in the case of the former USSR, of vital statistics (see tables below). The 
                                                  
7  The data in the fourth row  of the two tables below refer to Europe and Central Asia, but the poor in the 
area are essentially concentrated in the transition countries of Eastern Europe (including South-Eastern 
Europe) and of the former Soviet Union. 
8  Cf. World Bank (2009), p. 70.. 
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psychological hardship of the new poor in transition countries could have been made 
worse “by the drop from earlier achieved levels and expectations, and the loss of security” 
(Nuti, 2009). But in comparison to the countries where poverty was more permanent and 
more widespread the new poor in transition countries could benefit of the household 
goods accumulated in the past and of a better chance to be helped by better off relatives 
and acquaintances. 
2.2 The world poor as a percentage 
But on the whole the share of the poor in the human population has never been so 
low. 
According to the historical estimates reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, 
pp. 731-732), and taking into account the number of conventional poor people in 2001, 
estimated by the World Bank, as well as the estimate of the size of world population in 
2001, reported in table 4, the share of world population living in poverty diminishes from 
94,4% in 1820 to 44% in 2001, that of those living in extreme poverty from 83,9 in 1820 
down to 18% in 2001. In the end, taking into account the fact that in the period the share 
of the poor has been greatly reduced, the fundamental explanation of why there are so 
many poor people in the world is that there are so many people around. Indeed, human 
population has increased steadily and dramatically in the last two centuries, and in 
particular in the last few decades. Some relevant data are reported in table 4. 9 
                                                  
9  The data from 1800 in Europe, and from 1900 in the other continents are regarded, by and large, to have a 
fair degree of reliability. The data concerning the previous years are just estimates or, even, more or less, 
wild guesses. They should be considered to give an order of magnitude, rather than provide reliable data 
with any degree of precision (on this see Caldwell and Schindlmayr, 2002). Indeed, this applies even more 
to the estimates concerning national income in the tables that follow. 
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Table 3 Human population in the course of history (in millions) 
8000 BC 5  
1000 BC 50  
500 BC 100  
1 AD 231  
1000  268  
1500 438  
1600 556  
1700 603  
1750  790  
1800 980  
1820 1,041 
1870 1,271 
1913 1,791  
1950 2,535  
1960 3,032  
1970 3,699  
1980 4,451  
1990 5,295 
1995 5,719  
2001 6,148 
2005 6, 515  
2010 6,815, April 2010, as projected according to the World population clock 
The sources of the data are as follows: 8000 BC, Haub, 1995, p. 5, quoted in US Census Bureau 
(2007a); 1000 and 500 BC, McEvedy and Jones, 1978, pp. 342-351, quoted in US Census Bureau 
(2007a); 1-1700 and 1820-1913, Maddison (2006), p. 636; 1750 and 1800, United Nations, 1999; 1950-
2005, United Nations, 2006, with the exception of 2001, taken from US Census Bureau 2007b.  
 
To grasp the extent of the dramatic acceleration of population growth in recent 
times one may notice that the increase in population in the ten years between 1995 and 
2005 (796 million) is more or less the same as that in the 10,000 years or so from the start 
of the agricultural revolution to the dawn of the industrial revolution (for which we may 
conventionally take the year 1750). Looking at the first lines of the table, comparing them 
with the last ones, one is forced to come to terms with the fact that the momentous 
historical events of our distant past, recollected and magnified in history books, involved 
such comparatively insignificant numbers of people. 
2.3 The evaluation of poverty 
Of course this depends crucially on the definition of the poor. Here we use the 
World Bank definition, whereby the poor are defined in terms of absolute purchasing 
power, establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum … level of consumption to 
meet basic human needs” (World Bank,  2008, p. 2). This may not well correspond to a 
subjective, socially and environmentally conditioned, definition of poverty, in the sense of 
deprivation (see on this point, in particular, Kenny, 2006). 10 Subjective deprivation may be 
                                                  
10  Kenny emphasizes the negative impact of increasing expectations and new consumer goods on welfare or 
happiness. But happiness is a rather subjective matter, well expressed by the Italian poet Metastasio: “Se a 
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a function of achieved living standards, and increasing expectations, while relative poverty 
depends on distribution. Subjective poverty depends on habits and aspirations, where the 
latter increase with the diffusion, facilitated by the means of mass communication, of the 
consumption models of the better off. Notwithstanding all these complex qualitative 
aspects of poverty, without a common quantitative measure one could hardly make 
intertemporal comparisons. Of course, in making them one should ideally go into detail as 
to the specific relevant circumstances of the various cases (possibly extending the narrative 
to the whole range of Sen’s capabilities). Here we may be content to note that the trends in 
average incomes are corroborated by comparable trends in vital statistics (see below), 
which refer to qualitative important aspects of living standards. 
How are the poverty benchmarks of the World Bank at 1$ a day and 2$ a day 
determined? Basically the first refers to the average national poverty level of a set of the 
poorest countries of the world, and the second to the average national poverty level of the 
developing countries as a whole. Recently the World Bank has revalued the dimension of 
world poverty, following a new expanded data base of household income and expenditure 
surveys, and a new comprehensive assessment of PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) exchange 
rates. In particular the internal price level in a number of poor countries has turned out to 
be higher than previously understood. A reason advanced is that the lower quality of goods 
consumed by the poor in poorer countries was not sufficiently accounted for.11 A new 
extreme poverty benchmark level has been set at 1.25 US$ at 2005 purchasing power, and 
the new poverty level at 2 US$ at 2005 purchasing power. According to the new criteria 
extreme poverty is more widespread than according to the old: the number of people living 
in extreme poverty is now estimated at 1.4 billion people, and that of those living in 
poverty at 2.5 billion. The percentage of the world population living in poverty has been 
revalued at 47%, and of those living in extreme poverty at 25%. However the dynamic 
aspect of world poverty has remained qualitatively the same, since even with the new 
estimates “over 15 years global poverty fell by an average of 1 percentage point a year” 
(World Bank, 2008, p.1). Moreover “Global poverty measured at the $1.25 a day line has 
been decreasing since the 1980s. The number of people living in extreme poverty fell from 
1.9 billion in 1981 to 1.8 billion in 1990 to about 1.4 billion in 2005” (ibidem, p. 10). At the 
same time “the poverty rate for all developing countries measured at [the median poverty 
rate of 2 PPP$ 2005] fell from nearly 70 percent in 1981 to 47 percent in 2005, but the 
number of people living on less than $2.00 a day has remained nearly constant at 2.5 
billion” (ibidem), less than the 2.7 billion in 2001 estimated according to the old criteria (an 
obvious consequence of the fact that the purchasing power of 2$ in 2005 is markedly lower 
than that of 2$ in 1985). The criteria used for defining extreme poverty according to the 
new benchmarks are still the same as before—“the poverty line typical of the poorest 
countries of the world” establishing “a realistic lower bound for the minimum… level of 
consumption to meet basic human needs” (ibidem, pp. 1-2). In particular, “the new extreme 
poverty line is set at $1.25 a day in 2005 PPP terms, which represents the mean of the 
poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked by per capita consumption” 
                                                                                                                                                
ciascun l'interno affanno si leggesse in fronte scritto, quanti mai, che invidia fanno, ci farebbero pietà!” (“If 
everybody’ s internal pain were written on their forehead, many who are envied now, would be pitied 
instead.”) As economists, we may content ourselves of dealing with per capita incomes, but with many 
caveats, among others of the kind argued by Kenny. On happiness and economic growth see also Easterlin, 
1996, pp. 131-144. 
11  Cf. World Bank, 2008, pp. 3,8. 
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(ibidem, p. 22). In turn $2 a day in 2005 PPP terms represents the median poverty line for 
the developing countries of the world (ibidem, p. 10).  
3. An unequal world 
While a considerable share of world population still lives in poverty, world income 
and wealth are very unequally distributed. A recent research by Wider, the ONU economic 
research centre on poverty and development12 (Davis et alii, 2006a), shows the extent of 
world inequality in the distribution of personal wealth: 13  
The 24 richer OECD countries own 83% of world private wealth (64% at PPP$) 
with only 15% of world population and a per capita wealth of $116,000 (114,000 at PPP$). 
The 64 poorest countries with 40% of world population own 2% of world personal wealth 
(8% at PPP$), with a per capita wealth of 1000$ (5000 at PPP$)14 
In 2000 the 1% richest adults owned the 40% of overall private wealth (32% in  
PPP$ terms)15; the richest 10%, 85%; the poorest 50%, 1% (4% in PPP$ terms).16 
The Gini index of inequality of overall world wealth distribution (calculated using 
current exchange rates) is given as 89 (80 in PPP$ terms)17, the same as that of a group of 
10, where a single person has 1000, and the remaining nine 1 each.18 
Income is distributed less unequally than wealth, but still in a markedly unequal 
way. According to most estimates, reported in Milanovic (2006, p. 8), the Gini coefficient 
of world income distribution is around 65% in the contemporary world.19 To make a 
comparison, the Gini index of the distribution of family incomes of Italy is reported (in 
CIA, 2007) as 36, of the USA 45, of Sweden 25. The state where the Gini index appears to 
be highest, among those reported in CIA’s World Factbook, 2007 is Namibia with 71, but 
                                                  
12  World Institute for Development Economics Research: http://www.wider.unu.edu. 
13  Where personal wealth is defined as “the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities” (Davies et alii, 
2006a, p. 1). The data refer to the year 2000. Methodology: “average wealth level: based on household 
balance sheets and wealth survey data for 38 countries (56% of the world population and 80% of wealth) 
extended by regression methods to most other countries region--income class averages imputed to 
remaining countries…distribution of wealth: based on distribution data for 20 countries wealth 
concentration estimated from income distribution for most other countries region--income class averages 
imputed to remaining countries” (Davies et alii, 2006b). The data refer to the year 2000, and are either 
measured in dollar terms at the current exchange rates or in Purchasing Power Parity dollars (PPP$; this 
means that all values are converted in dollars using exchange rates so determined that the purchasing power 
of the dollar will be more or less the same once transformed in the various world currencies). It must be 
noted that passing from current dollars to PPP$ reduces somewhat world inequality, since the dollar 
purchasing power is usually higher in poorer countries, but it does not alter substantially the global picture. 
It should also be noted that an inquiry such as the one referred to above is based on limited data and 
fraught with methodological difficulties; it must be therefore stressed that, as always is the case with 
statistics, but even more in the present instance, the data should be considered to give some order of 
magnitude rather than to be taken at face value. For a detailed explanation of the methods used in the 
inquiry one may refer to the above source. 
14  Ibidem, Table 8. 
15  “37% reside in the US, 27% in Japan” (Davies et alii, 2006b). 
16  Davies et alii, 2006a, Table 10, and Table 11a. 
17  Ibidem, Table 12.. 
18  Davies et alii, 2006b, p. 9. 
19  The paper by Milanovic contains an interesting critical review of the different methodological approaches 
used to get those values. 
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perhaps only because in other, even more unequal, third world countries no statistical data 
allowing its calculation are available. 20 
Table 4. Poverty and income distribution in recent world history 
year Gini coefficient of world income distribution 
Percentage of the population living in 
Poverty 
Percentage of the population living in extreme poverty 
1820 0.500 94.4 83.9 
1850 0.532 92.5 81.5 
1870 0.560 89.6 75.4 
1890 0.588 85.7 71.7 
1910 0.610 82.4 65.6 
1929 0.616 75.9 56.3 
1950 0.640 71.9 54.8 
1960 0.635 64.3 44 
1970 0.650 60.1 35.6 
1980 0.657 55 31.5 
1992 0.657 51.3 23.7 
2001 0.657 (0.699)a 44 18 
Data taken from Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731); the percentages of the two right cells of the last row are 
calculated from population data in table 3 and Word Bank poverty data according to the older 1$ - 2$ methodology 
(which is used by Bourguignon and Morrison). aCalculation from 2002 World Income Distribution Database in Milanovic 
(28/12/2007); the figure between brackets is calculated using the recently revised set of PPP$ exchange rates.  
3.1 Inequality between nations and inequality inside nations 
From the historical viewpoint it appears that in the past (before the “great 
divergence”21) income differences inside nations were relatively more relevant than 
nowadays in the determination of global inequality. In the pre-industrial world more than 
half of global income inequality could have been due to inequality in income distribution 
inside nations, while today the prevailing component, about 70%, is deemed to be due to 
differences in average per-capita incomes between nations (Milanovic, 2006, p. 9). On the 
other hand in more recent times the weight of the inside nations component seems to have 
somewhat increased, but the trend is not uniform in the different regions of the world.22 
The greater growth rate of less developed countries as a whole should be a factor leading to 
the reduction of the between nations component, while increased inequality inside 
developed countries is a factor contributing to the increased inside world inequality 
component. According to the data reported in Bourguignon and Morrison (2002, p. 731) 
there has been an increase through time in the world Gini coefficient, from 50 in 1820 up 
to the present values (see table 4). Values for so far away periods seem to be rather 
speculative estimates, even more daring than the speculative estimates needed to arrive at 
an aggregate measure for the contemporary world as a whole.23 But it seems plausible that 
                                                  
20  Such as in particular in Equatorial Guinea that, according to CIA (2007), has the “fourth highest per capita 
income in the world” but where the great bulk of the population allegedly lives in desperate conditions with 
less than a dollar a day (cf. also “Playboy waits for his African throne “, Sunday Times, 3/9/2006, available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article626511.ece). 
21  Cf. Pomeranz, 2000. 
22  Cf. Nel, 2006, p. 697I; IMF, 2007a, pp. 138 f. 
23  And indeed the methodological approach of the two authors appears to be particularly rough. See on this 
regard Milanovic, 2009, pp. 2-3; Baten et alii, 2009. On the other hand the results of the latter study, 
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the differences in income should have been lower in the past, owing to the fact that the 
great bulk of the population was living close to subsistence level, and given the low overall 
average per capita incomes. In a quite recent paper Milanovic (2009) revises the estimates 
of Burguignon and Morrison, arriving at some interesting quantitative conclusions: The 
global Gini coefficient for 1820 is reduced to 43. The Gini coefficient measuring inequality 
between nations (where individual incomes inside any given nation are taken as equal to the 
average value) raises from 15 to 32 between 1820 and 1870, increasing up to 55-60 in the 
after WWII period, showing some reduction in the last twenty years due to the economic 
progress of China and India in particular. Between 1820 and the present times, the between 
countries component of the global world inequality index raises from 35 to 80-85 percent.  
4. What is the source of the present high inequalities and what can we 
do about it 
4.1 Poverty, inequality, maximum potential inequality, and the extraction rate 
According to table 4, while world inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, 
has steadily increased since 1820 (an increase of the coefficient between 31% and 40% in 
Table 5, according to the two different estimates of the 2001 value), there has been a 
dramatic increase in per capita incomes, and the proportion of paupers in the world has 
steadily decreased. 
 
Fig. 1 The maximum possible Gini coefficient as a function of average income 
 
                                                                                                                                                
pursued through an alternative, but also rough, methodological approach confirm on the whole 
a
(Y°-wsP°)/Y° 
wsP°/Y° 
wsP/Y° Y/Y° 
P/P° (wsP/Y°)/(P/P°)=wsP°/Y° 
Gini coefficient: a/(1/2)=2a. The greater the productivity of the economy, the lower the 
line wsP/Y° and the greater the area a and the greater the maximum  Gini coefficient. 
P°=> total population, made up by subsistence workers: the dimension of the 
elite is negligible; P/P°=> P-workers’ population share; wS=>subsistence wage;  
Y°=>total income; YW/Y°=>P-workers’ income share, where YW=wsP 
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Under primitive conditions, when per capita incomes are close to the subsistence 
level, the amount of surplus the economy can produce above physical subsistence is 
limited. This limits the percentage of the national income that can be appropriated by the 
elite, and thus the maximum level of the inequality measure (such as the Gini coefficient or 
the Theil index) that can be possibly achieved, assuming an elite dimensionally nought in 
relation to the whole population. As per capita levels increase, this leads to an increase in 
the percentage of the national income that could be accounted for as surplus above 
subsistence, and to an increase in the maximum achievable inequality, as measured, say, by 
the maximum Gini coefficient compatible with the maintenance of the mass of the 
population at the physical subsistence level, 24 and thus with the minimal condition 
ensuring persistence in its actual dimensions of the given society over time.25 Thus we may 
consider as a true measure of the extent of inequality achieved by a given society not the 
inequality index (such as the Gini coefficient) per se, but the percentage achieved of the 
maximum inequality index associated with a given per capita income level. According to 
the definition in Milanovic (2009) and Milanovic et alii (2007), this is the inequality 
extraction ratio (from now on: ier). With the increase in world per capita income following 
the industrial revolution the maximum possible inequality index, which may be measured in 
terms of Gini coefficient or of Theil index, progressively increases. According to Milanovic 
(2009, p. 18) the maximum possible world Gini coefficient increases from 56 in 1820 to 95 
in 2005. As we have seen from the Bourguignon-Morrison (henceforward BM) data the 
actual world Gini coefficient has increased, but at a lower rate. Taking the data of table 4 
this means that the inequality extraction ratio decreases from 50/56=89% in 1820 to 
66/95=70% or 70/95=74% (in case of the higher Gini estimate) in 2005. However, 
Milanovic (2009) brings down the Gini coefficient in 1820 to the lower level of 43, and this 
leads to a much lower reduction in the extraction ratio between 1820 and 2005, from 
43/56=77% to 74 or 70%. In terms of the Theil index, however, the reduction in ier is 
much more relevant, halving from 70% in 1820 to 35% in 2005 (p. 18). Even the almost 
invariant Gini extraction rates however hide quite a deep change: while the inequality 
extraction rate inside nations has on average strongly decreased, the between nations 
component of inequality, and of the inequality extraction rate, had markedly increased. We 
may arrive therefore at the conclusion, on the basis of the degree of the decrease of 
inequality extraction rate inside nations, that on the whole the propensity to inequality has 
very much decreased, and that the responsibility for the increased inequality between 1820 
                                                                                                                                                
Bourguignon and Morrison’s results. 
24  As Milanovic (2004, p. 24) puts it: “Average income levels also set an upper boundary on inequality. … As 
societies develop, income inequality has the ‘space’ to grow simply because there is a surplus which can be 
appropriated or redistributed among members of the society.” 
25  In a Malthusian perspective the population itself can be seen as a function of the part of income that is 
allocated in supplying subsistences. By given resources and technology, whenever decreasing returns set in 
there are two conflicting effects of population increase on the size of surplus: 1. by any given per capita 
surplus, more people bring in more total extractable surplus; 2. but more people decrease per capita surplus 
produced. If the relationship is perceived, it can affect, in theory at least, the extraction and population 
policy of the elite, since under pre-industrial circumstances more extraction can bring about a population 
reduction, less extraction an increase. It can be easily seen in this respect that in the long run the size of the 
population that allows the maximum surplus extraction is when the marginal productivity of labour is equal 
to the subsistence wage, while the maximum possible population is when there is no surplus and per capita 
income is equal to the subsistence wage. 
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and present times is entirely of the “great divergence”, the dramatic increase in the well 
being of the economically more advanced countries. The overall trend towards the decrease 
of inequality (and of the extraction ratio) inside nations could have been a consequence of 
the changed nature of political and economic institutions and of greater economic and 
social complexity, both causes and consequences of modern economic growth. To some 
extent the degree of inequality may be a consequence of the rules of economic organization 
(the economic system) that allow the attainment of the given production level (as argued, 
with some exaggeration, by Marx, 1875: “any distribution whatever of the means of 
consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production 
themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself”). 
Thus it is conceivable that under real circumstances inequality could not be reduced below 
some level (such as measured by Gini coefficient) without bringing about a reduction of 
income produced, and of its growth.26 At the same time too much inequality can have a 
negative impact on income and growth.27 One could then modify the concept of extraction 
rate as referring to the additional inequality above the minimum level compatible with the 
attainment of the given per capita income.28 The extraction rate would than refer to the 
proportion of the difference between the two, concretely attained by an individual 
economy. At the same time it is conceivable that the degree of inequality compatible with 
the attainment of a certain level of per capita income could vary according to the specific  
institutional characteristics of the economic system.  
Obviously one thing is inequality of incomes, another inequality of welfare. The 
latter is a very elusive concept, but it is what really matters. The first is at best a proxy. In 
considering how does income inequality translate into inequality in welfare it seems 
reasonable to assume decreasing utility of income, appraised for instance through 
“extended sympathy” (putting oneself in somebody else’s shoes). As a consequence one 
can argue that the income inequalities of the present have lesser relevance than the 
inequalities of the past, since they could be associated with lower inequalities in terms of 
welfare. Another relevant consideration is that welfare (what is called welfare in common 
language) depends on a set of non-economic circumstances, such as degree of inequality in 
social dignity, degree of inequality in civil rights, feeling of personal security, envy or 
compassion, etc. Furthermore one should also consider the different subjective cost, or 
satisfaction, of productive activities (such as discussed in the edonic theory of wages), the 
value attributed to economic success, the life standards needed for some professionals to 
"function" as such, the structure of political power, the rule of law, and personal dangers as 
                                                  
26  “An artificially compressed distribution of income differs from the optimal distribution based on 
differences in talent, merit, and effort, and for this reason inhibits growth by affecting incentives, labour 
shirking, and free-riding behaviour” (Cornia, 2004, p. 9), where the implied optimality presumably refers to 
the objective of fostering growth, and perhaps to some implied social welfare function. 
27  Cf. Milanovic et al. (2007, pp. 29-30): “More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much support from history. 
On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been correlated with extreme concentration of 
political power, and that power has always been used to widen the income gaps through rent-seeking and 
rent-keeping, forces that demonstrably retard economic growth.” For the relationship of inequality and 
growth, and the hypothesis that it could be u-shaped (too little as well as too much inequality being 
adversary to growth) see Cornia et al. (2004). 
28 Operationally we could, for instance, take the minimum level of inequality in comparable economies having 
similar levels of per capita income as a lower bound to the minimum amount of inequality compatible with 
the sustainable production of the given per capita income., and as an upper bound the maximum level of 
inequality in comparable economies having similar levels of per capita income. 
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related to status.  But all these kinds of considerations, which are akin to those made before 
with regard to poverty in section 2.4 would lead us too astray and we shall be content to 
refer to the basic economic data, taking comfort from the fact that people vote on welfare 
with their feet, moving from countries where per capita incomes are lower towards 
countries where per capita incomes are higher. Thus it may be fair to assume that 
inequalities in income and inequalities in welfare go together. 
In the end, seen in an historical context, the extent of present economic inequality 
appears not to depend on the paupers of the world being worse off, since an increasing 
proportion of them are progressively lifted from a state of absolute abject poverty, but on 
the fact that on the whole the lot of humans has dramatically, albeit quite unequally, 
improved. 
We could then modify Milanovic’s concept of extraction rate as referring to the 
additional inequality above the minimum level compatible with the production of at least 
the given per capita income. How much inequality would be needed to bring about a given 
production level is not de facto determinable, as it may depend on an a number of different 
circumstances that differ from one country to another, from one period of time to another, 
such as technology, avaibility of human and social capital, tradition and mental structures, 
dimension of a country, social knowledge of possible organizational variants etc. In the end 
a discourse of this kind could become rather murky, as always is the case with 
counterfactuals. But it seems plausible that some inequality is needed, if only for incentive 
and allocative purposes, in order to achieve some given rate of production, even with the 
most egalitarian approach to social organization. The above notional modification to the 
concept of surplus extraction, even if not easily quantifiable, may strengthen the conclusion 
that overall the rate of surplus extraction could be markedly lower nowadays than in the 
past if one considers that part of the increased in inequality of present times, as measured 
by Gini coefficient, could be the inevitable by-product of a more complex system of 
production leading to much higher per capita incomes, while inequality in the past could 
have been to a greater extent the consequence of an intrinsically exploitative system of 
social relations.  
4.2 Demographic explosion, economic growth and medical progress 
As a consequence of the unprecedented economic progress and of the diffusion of 
medical and hygiene innovations from the West to the Rest of the world, the rate of 
growth of world population has never been so high as after WWII (see Table 6). Among 
the regions of the world the highest demographic growth rate has been that of Africa, the 
poorest region with the least economic growth.29 From this it is immediately evident that 
the strongest factor explaining the demographic explosion is the diffusion of medical 
innovations rather than economic growth per se (which at some stage leads to reduction of 
                                                  
29  The extreme poverty rate of less than 1$ a day in Sub-Saharan Africa is reported as 41% in IMF, October 
2007b, p. 20. On the whole the post-independence economic performance of African countries (with some 
exceptions, notably Botswana) has been dismal: “on average, over the period 1960–2000 Africa’s 
population-weighted per capita annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) was a mere 0.1%” (Collier, 
2007a, p. 16763). But African economic performance has much improved since the late nineties (cf. IMF, 
2007a pp. 9, f.; IMF, 2007b); in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, per capita growth was running, before the 
recent economic crisis, at about 3% a year, not a bad performance considering the very high population 
growth rate (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). 
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natality).30 The population explosion, together with the composite ethnic structure of the 
artificial political divisions left over from colonial times, replicated in the post-colonial state 
boundaries,31 and the low educational attainments, contribute to explain the tensions and 
bloody conflicts that have engulfed that unfortunate continent.32 
4.3 What can be done 
As to the concretely implementable measures for bringing about a more equal 
distribution, and reducing poverty, without affecting the unique engine of growth and 
welfare that has been running in the last sixty years or so of world history, there is no much 
clarity of thought. As is often the case, what appears at first sight is not what really is, if one 
looks rationally at the implications.  
4.3.1 Globalization, poverty and distribution 
For instance the various proposals for limiting the extent of the liberalization of the 
world market, such as advocated by the various anti-WTO and trade-unions inspired 
movements, would probably hamper a main source of growth and economic improvement 
of the enterprising poor.33 Indeed, it appears that for reducing the plight of the poor more 
globalization is needed, not less.34 Globalization improves the welfare of the worst off 
essentially because it is conducive to greater growth35 that spills over to the very poor.36 
However not necessarily globalization and growth, considering also the impact of technical 
progress, lead to an improvement of the worst off in relative terms37 and increased 
inequality could contribute to offset the positive impact on welfare of the increases in real 
                                                  
30  The impact of economic growth on the Mortality Revolution, and hence on demographic growth (before 
fertility controls step in) is downplayed by Easterlin (1996, pp. 69-93). 
31  This does not mean that “natural” ethnical state boundaries would have existed anyway, given the 
patchwork distribution of ethnicities in the African continent. At any rate the complex ethnical structure of 
many African states appears to be an obstacle to development (cf. Easterly and Levine, 1997). The great 
success story in Africa, that of Botswana, may not be unrelated to the relatively great (for African standards) 
ethnic homogeneity of that country (ibidem, p. 1218). 
32  For a recent in-depth assessment of Africa’s economic predicaments see Collier, 2007a, and more amply, 
Collier 2007b. 
33  For the negative overall impact of protectionism on growth, see the quantitative inquiry in Milanovic 
(2005). Cf. also IMF (2007a, p. 157) for the favourable impact of international trade on the relative position 
of the lower quintiles. 
34  For data on trade and financial globalization accompanying the high growth performance of developing 
economies in more recent times, especially since the nineties, see IMF (2007a, pp. 135-139). Trade 
globalization can be measured in terms of the increasing ratio of imports and exports to GNP, financial 
globalization as cross-border assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. Of course globalization is more than 
that, and includes globalization in technical knowledge, information, travel and contacts across countries, 
regions and continents. Technical progress in communications and transportation, together with 
international trade and financial liberalization, have much contributed to all aspects of globalization.  
35  On the role of international trade and openness in conjuring development and economic progress see 
Dollar and Kray (2004) and the literature referred there. For a contrary, if rather unbalanced, view, see 
Milanovic (2003).  
36  “Evidence suggests that better growth is translating into declining poverty levels… for a sample of 19 low 
income countries, 1 percent of GDP growth was associated with a 1.3 percent fall in the rate of extreme 
poverty and a 0.9 percent fall in the $2-a-day poverty rate” (World Bank, 2007, p. 3). “Across all regions, 
the evidence therefore suggests that in an absolute sense the poor are no worse off (except in a few post-
crisis economies), and in most cases significantly better off, during the most recent phase of globalization“ 
“over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually all regions and all 
income groups” (IMF, October 2007a, p. 141). 
37  Whether globalization leads to a reduction or to an increase in inequality is a contentious issue. See on this 
point Milanovic (2006) and the literature quoted by him. 
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incomes.38 As to the trend in income distribution, apparently the main culprit of recent 
increases in economic inequality in some areas of the planet seems to have been 
technological progress, by demanding skills and qualifications and substituting less skilled 
labour.39 On the other hand economic “globalization” (in the sense of an increase of trade 
and financial flows,40 with the first having an overall equalizing, the second a disequalizing 
effect) appears to have had a different impact in the different areas of the world. According 
to IMF (2007a) economic globalization is seen to increase inequality somewhat in 
developed countries (because of the prevailing impact of financial liberalization, while trade 
liberalization is seen to exert an equalizing impact anyway41) and decrease inequality in the 
less developed ones (because of the prevailing impact of trade liberalization).42 At the same 
time the diffusion of technological advances all over the world is obviously itself a 
manifestation of “globalization” and could hardly be isolated from the other intervening 
factors (such as for instance financial liberalization, since foreign direct investment in 
particular constitutes an essential vehicle for international technological transfers).  
4.3.2 Aid and transfers 
As to transfers, it is hardly possible that transfers of the size needed to really bring 
about a significant reduction of world inequality in per capita income and wealth could be 
acceptable to the public opinions of better off countries;43 in general, the propensity to aid 
the poor of the world is quite widespread, especially in the “development buzz … 
generated by rock stars, celebrities and NGOs”44, but with somebody else’s money and 
resources. 45 As a prominent example we can mention the movement for international debt 
                                                  
38  Milanovic, 2006, p. 13: “the process of globalization by itself changes the perception of one’s position, and 
even if globalization may raise everybody’s real income, it could exacerbate, rather than moderate, feelings 
of despondency and deprivation among the poor.” This could contribute to create the motivation for 
migrating towards more affluent countries, while increasing incomes can supply the resources for meeting 
the costs of migration, often a costly business in relation to the scant resources of the poorest of the earth. 
(On the effect that raising incomes in poorer countries such as India and China can have on increasing the 
emigration push towards richer ones see Bhagwati, 2007, p. 210.) Finally, migration can be in itself a 
cumulative process, since successful migrants can finance through their remittances the travel costs of those 
left behind, and, at the same time, contribute to reduce the other costs of emigration through the “friends 
and relatives effects”. 
39  Cf. IMF (2007a, pp. 139-141). 
40  This corresponds to the World Bank’s narrow definition of globalization as the “freedom and ability of 
individuals and firms to initiate voluntary economic transactions with residents of other countries" (cf. 
Milanovic, 2002, p. 3).  
41  This appears to be contrary to what is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, but it may be explained 
by the reduction in the price of basic wage goods imported from developing countries, in particular, and by 
the reduction in the relative importance of worse paid manufacturing jobs (. IMF (2007a, pp. 155-156). As 
to the impact of financial liberalization in increasing inequalities both in developed and in underdeveloped 
countries this is attributed to the fact that “higher FDI inflows have increased the demand for skilled labor, 
whereas outward FDI in advanced economies has reduced the demand for relatively lower-skilled workers 
in these countries” (ibidem, p. 159). 
42  Cf. IMF, 2007a, ch. 4, pp. 135-170.  
43  The schemes that have been proposed in regard, reviewed by Milanovic (November 2007), seem utterly 
unrealistic. 
44  Collier, 2007b, p.4. 
45  As a prominent historical representative of the “somebody else’s money handouts” school we may 
mention Jeffrey Sachs. After all it is very easy for a practicing development economist to become popular 
with one’s charges by generously advocating the pledging of somebody else’s money. For a comprehensive 
criticism of past experience of aid and its bureaucratic implementation see Easterly (2006). For a hefty 
criticism of Easterly’s standpoint, and Easterly’s reply, see Sachs (2006) and Easterly (n.d). 
 17 
relief, where the proponents do not appreciate that the only radical way to suppress debt is 
to suppress credit, while insolvency makes international debt more risky, and therefore 
more onerous, and this is not necessarily in the interest of poorer countries.46 None of the 
vocal members of the debt remission campaign seems to have started an international 
voluntary subscription for paying off poorer countries’ debt by reimbursing the creditors, 
or advocating that government create an international special fund for the same purpose 
with taxpayers’ money, in order to eliminate, or reduce, the debt without worsening the 
credit rating of poorer debtors.47 Nevertheless the worsening of credit rating, and the 
consequent reduction in the capability to borrow, of poorer debtors could have some 
positive side.48 Often the debt problem arises from the propensity of populist and/or 
corrupt governments to over-borrow for financing consumption expenditures (the onus 
and unpopularity of servicing the debt will then fall on future governments), or the outright 
siphoning out of hard currency into the foreign bank accounts of the leaders. But a 
worsening of credit rating could also jeopardize the ability to borrow in an emergency or in 
an economic downturn, or for financing productive investment projects. An obvious fact 
that is overlooked by the debt remission campaign is that whenever the funds that have 
been borrowed are not repaid less is available for lending to other borrowers in need, and 
this is especially obvious with debts owed to the International Financial Institutions.49  
None of the many who deem just and natural that the pharmaceutical industry 
renounce exploiting the intellectual property of anti-Aids drugs, meritoriously discovered at 
the cost of huge investments, has proposed to start a subscription, or to pressurize 
governments for purchasing the corresponding patents at market value, in order to make 
them free for mankind, and in particular for the poorest and most affected by the disease 
section of world population, such as in Africa.50 An alternative, more practical, way to 
overcome the issue of the excessive cost of patented drugs would be for poorer countries 
not to adhere to the international conventions protecting intellectual property rights, but 
this would put them outside the WTO, since TRIPS (Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights) has become a part of WTO agreements.51 As a matter of 
                                                  
46  For the ambiguous aspects of debt relief, in particular that affecting the International Financial Institutions, 
see Easterly (2006), pp. 230-236. 
47  On the other hand the creation of such a special fund would bring about an obvious moral hazard 
problem. 
48  On this see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 216 f. 
49  Cf. Stiglitz, 2007, p. 228:“Today, the developing countries that have repaid what was owed … worry that 
debt relief is commandeering money that might otherwise have been available to them”. 
50  Some feasible projects of financing private or public medical research of specific relevance for poorer 
countries, and insufficiently financially rewarding for unfounded private medical research, with suitable 
contracts allowing poorer countries taking advantage through free access of the innovations thus produced, 
have been proposed. This kind of schemes would have the advantage of helping poorer countries with aid 
expenditures bypassing corrupt and inefficient governments, helping, at the same time, the production of 
public goods useful for the whole of mankind. In general aid expenditure resulting in the creation of public 
goods that are of particular interest for poorer countries (for instance producing information or educational 
material) could by-pass their government and administrations and remedy at the same time the 
inefficiencies deriving from the insufficient provision of public goods. 
51  See the entry TRIPS in Wikipedia, and the sources listed there. [References from Wikipedia are usually 
shunned because of the way mistaken and inexactitudes can be incorporated (but also corrected) by 
everybody concerned. But a basic principle of Wikipedia is that all information should be supported by 
external sources to which one should refer for control. Moreover many articles are constantly updated and 
are of surprising depth and quality. I must take this opportunity to express my indebtedness to Wikipedia, 
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fact underdeveloped countries have little to gain and much to lose from the degree of 
protection of intellectual property rights contemplated by TRIPS. Even if they do not 
comply, still a large market (that of developed countries), where intellectual rights are 
protected, and innovation is financed by market proceeds, would remain.52 With the Doha 
Declaration (adopted in Doha, in November 2001 by the WTO Ministerial Conference) the 
extent of TRIPS has been attenuated, and some further development in this direction could 
be contemplated in future WTO negotiations.53 In theory a possible way to reconcile the 
objective of maintaining revenues and incentives for intellectual production with that of 
helping the less developed countries could be to transfer part of development aid 
expenditures to national producers of intellectual public goods (preferably through some 
general measures such as tax rebates), while allowing to the underdeveloped economies (or 
some subset of them such as the poorest ones) their free utilization.54 The downside is that 
lack of protection for intellectual goods could dampen their production in the 
underdeveloped countries themselves; at a certain stage of their development even less 
developed countries may decide that protection is worth the while. In practice it is hard to 
expect that developed countries, and especially the USA, could allow an attenuation of the 
protection of intellectual goods, owing to the intensity of the lobbying by the industries 
concerned. Indeed, the latter have already succeeded to extend the protection to much 
higher levels than what appears reasonable and economically justifiable.55 
As far as aid in general is concerned there is the issue of the lasting effects of the 
culture of dependency in perpetuating the poverty trap, by facilitating the survival of 
corrupt and inefficient governments, and the old saying that international aid amounts to 
taking away from the poor of the donor countries for giving to the rich of the receiving 
countries, which, in its apparent paradox, may capture a relevant aspect of international 
aid.56 What is sometimes overlooked in popular discussions is that aid usually does not 
                                                                                                                                                
one of the greatest intellectual achievements of our age, for constantly supplying a first information and 
direction on previously  uncharted territories.] 
52  On TRIPS and intellectual property issues concerning less developed countries see Stiglitz, 2007, pp. 103-
132. 
53  An issue in this respect would be competitive export of goods benefiting of lack of intellectual protection 
to developed economies. But this may not be insurmountable, since the developed economies could 
undertake far-reaching specific import controls, as they do on many commodities in general. Of more 
practical relevance may be the lack of actual enforcement of the discipline concerning protection of 
intellectual property, whatever the theoretical obligations associated to the underwriting of TRIPS, and the 
legal measures implemented.  
54 There are also other profiles to be accounted for: intellectual production has low material and energy 
intensity, does not produce goods that must be disposed for at the end of their consumer cycle. Thus to 
shift from the production of material goods to the production of intellectual goods could have many 
advantages. 
55  For instance the extension of the economic protection of copyright after 50 years at least after the death of 
the author, contemplated by TRIPS (not to speak of the 70 years of the US or European legislation; see 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries%27_copyright_length, and the sources listed there) seems 
hardly to be required to stimulate the production of intellectual works. How reasonable is it to expect that 
the motivation of an author towards intellectual creation be influenced by the economic property rights 
somebody else may have after his own death (not to speak 50 and more years after)? All this simply 
amounts to the imposition of rents for past production of intellectual goods, to the advantage of some who 
were not involved in their creation, reducing their diffusion and enjoyment, not to an incentive for future 
production, 
56  According to Knack (1999) “Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening 
accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, 
 19 
directly transfer resources to the poorer of the world, since it is governments that act as 
representatives of the inhabitants of a country (“aids goes to governments, not to poor 
people: much of it benefits relatively well-to-do groups”57), and governments in poorer 
countries are often comparatively more corrupt and inefficient.58 There is the damaging 
possibility that aid be simply wasted away and siphoned off by corrupt regimes, or, even 
worse, spent in armaments, feeding third world wars.59 It is argued that aid, analogously to 
natural resources windfalls, weakens the determination to reform and to combat corruption 
and may hamper growth through the so-called Dutch disease, by increasing prices and 
wage costs.60 Analogously to the rents from oil and natural resources, and even more than 
them, aid has been found to have a negative impact on democracy.61 Theoretically speaking 
aid could aid reform and better governance through ex-ante conditionality, but, besides 
being strongly resented as a violation of sovereignty, and sometimes as a plot of richer 
countries to the detriment of aid receivers, smacking of paternalism, neo-colonialism, or 
even imperialism, ex-ante conditionality apparently does not work in practice, at least with 
respect to the poorer countries with worse governance.62 It is also doubtful whether 
massive aid transfers, as proposed by some, could raise the long term growth prospects, 
even if they could certainly increase the short-run average incomes (but not necessarily the 
incomes of the poor) of the recipient countries.63 According to Boone (1995) “Aid does not 
                                                                                                                                                
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and 
institutions.” And “analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality 
of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law.” For the 
tendency of aid to benefit corrupt and undemocratic governments, see Easterly, 2006, p.133: (according to 
him “aid shifts money from being spent by the best governments in the world to being spent by the 
worst”). For a discussion of this issue and of the way to overcome it see Milanovic (October 2007). To his 
plea for taking into account, in directing aid, the degree in inequality of income distribution in the receiving 
countries, “penalizing countries with highly unequal distribution” one may add that the degree of inequality 
may be seen as an indicator of the extraction power of the elite in a receiving country, and of its power to 
appropriate the advantages of transfers, increasing the probability of the latter acting regressively. 
57  Bauer, 1976b, p. 397. According to Milanovic (2005b, pp. 133-34) even random transfers from the poorest 
dicile of the richest countries with not too skewed income distribution (so this does not apply to rich 
inegalitarian countries such as the United States) to the richest decile of the poorest countries would make 
the international distribution of incomes less unequal, taking into account the relative positions in the 
international income distribution. But aid transfers are not random, and as long as they directly benefit the 
ruling political class in poor countries, whose revenues could be well above those of the upper decile, and 
they may turn out to make the international income distribution more unequal, rather than equal.  
58  We may refer in this respect to the classification of Transparency International. An extreme case is 
mentioned by Collier (2007b, p. 66): only 1% of the funds spent by the Government of Chad for financing 
rural health clinics actually reached them. Another less extreme case relates to Uganda, where “only around 
20 percent of the money that the Ministry of Finance released for primary schools, other than for teachers’ 
salaries, actually reached the schools” (p. 150). 
59  According to Collier (2007b, p. 103) “something around 40 percent of Africa’s military spending is 
inadvertently financed by aid”.  
60  Collier, 2007b, pp. 40 f. According to Collier (ibidem, p. 102) “large inflows of money without any 
restrictions do not seem to be well spent in many of the countries of the bottom billion.” 
61  See Djankov et alii (2006). 
62  Collier (2007b), pp. 109-110. For a consideration how aid could be tailored to really help the development 
of  “the bottom million”, see Collier’s chapter 7, pp. 99-123. 
63  For a sceptical view on the ability of aid to raise growth of the recipient countries, see in particular Easterly, 
2006, ch. 2, pp. 60-55. For a recent survey of the literature on the effectiveness of aid to enhance the 
growth prospects of poor countries, and a more positive conclusion, see Arndt et al. (2009). An argument 
making ethically desirable massive income transfers to the poorer countries of the world that is frequently 
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significantly increase investment and growth, nor benefit the poor”.64 There is presently a 
vast opinion on the negative aspects of aid, as exposed also in some recent bestsellers, but one 
may remind that many considerations that have become popular in recent times were voiced by 
Peter Bauer in times when they were considered politically incorrect and contrary to common 
opinion.65 Some more optimistic assessment could be reserved to specific forms of aid directly 
aiming to remove some kind of barrier to development, such as the aid-for-trade scheme, 
which is mired to remove the administrative and physical constraints to international trade.66 
But here too there is the problem of assessing, aside from the intentions and the means, the 
effective destination and implementation of the aid effort. A much more effective and less 
complicated way, but perhaps hardly politically feasible, way to help the poorer countries to 
trade would be eliminate the restrictions on their imports in the markets of the richer countries, 
extending the system of generalized preferences to the areas where they are effectively 
competitive, such as “simple” manufactured products.  On the other hand there is a specific 
type of aid that the more prosperous countries are giving freely and massively, and mostly 
unintentionally, which mostly goes unremarked. Through the scientific progress and the 
technological advances they produce, they create public goods that deeply affect the 
economic and social fabrics of less developed countries. This is probably the fundamental 
explanation of the great economic and demographic advances of most less developed 
countries in relation to their past.67 The same applies to the example provided by the 
economic, social and political institutions of more developed countries, in particular to the 
basic idea of democracy, according to which governments should be changed by the ballot, 
rather than through civil strife and violent means. The latter have the fundamental 
disadvantage, in comparison to the ballot, to be usually much more expensive in terms of 
wasted economic resources, not to speak of the other, non-economic, profiles. Of course 
ballots serve their purpose if they are credible, this means not fundamentally rigged, 
otherwise sham democracy is not of much use. 
4.3.3 Changing the basis of the international economic order 
As to changing the basis of the international economic order from free exchange 
and market to supernational planned allocation and material barters, even aside from the 
concrete issue of its (in)feasibility, the past Comecon experience of planned material 
exchanges is not really enticing; the same applies to the other historical instances where 
barter exchange prevailed, with consequent high transaction costs and greatly reduced gains 
from trading. To some extent distribution is internationally, alike inside nations, a 
consequence of the institutions that regulate and, directly or indirectly, affect production 
and exchange. The institutions that may favour high levels of productivity and growth, 
such as the remarkable performance of the developing countries, aside from the 
unfortunate “bottom billion”, reaching in the last two decades of the last century the 
unprecedented rate of 4 per cent of per capita income growth, and even more in the first 
                                                                                                                                                
advanced refers to the twin legacies of slave trade and colonialism. We shall return on this issue later on, in 
section 5.. 
64  For the discussion following Boone’s controversial paper, and further interesting contributions on the 
issue, see Easterly (2006), pp. 45-50. The fact that mere handouts to the governments of more backward 
countries may not be able to improve their development prospects is borne out by the curse of natural 
resources, whereby rents from natural resources would not help, but rather hinder successful economic 
development. 
65  See for instance Bauer, 1976b, pp. 95 f. 
66  Cf. Njinkeu and Cameron, 2008. 
67  See below, tables 5 to 9. 
 21 
years of the new millennium,68 have some distributional consequences that only partially 
can be mitigated without affecting economic outcomes. Thus to radically change those 
institutions could be against the interest of the world poor, despite the deep injustice of a 
world where at least 60% of one’s position in the global personal income distribution can 
be explained by the accident of being born in a country instead than somewhere else, and a 
good deal of the rest by the accident of having been born in a family rather than in 
another.69 In reality the greatest practical opportunities for redistribution appear to lie 
inside countries through reform of their institutions and the political process. In lower and 
middle income countries, particularly in those with good natural resource endowments, the 
specific extractive nature of the institutions, enhanced by the absence of checks and 
balances, often leads to the formation of high incomes based on rents, whereby the 
resulting high degree of inequality (at a Gini coefficient of 40 and above) represents a brake 
to growth rather than a by-product of growth-enhancing institutions and social processes,70 
not to speak of the much higher risk of civil war and instability associated with 
“dependence upon primary commodity exports”.71 
The most radical way to overcome this issue would be the cosmopolitan one to 
make of the world a single country, with the power and responsibility to decide and enact 
redistribution policies. One could only (idly) speculate about the kinds of institutions and 
economic governance such a cosmopolitan world would have. But for good or for worse 
humanity is divided into separate territorial states, and solidarity towards the citizens of 
other states is usually much weaker than solidarity towards fellow citizens, or, even more, 
especially where there are strong ethnic divisions inside states, towards one’s own ethnic 
community. Moreover measures of solidarity are also the outcome of the fact that citizens, 
however destitute, are partaking into, and therefore have some scope for influencing 
through collective action, the political process, albeit with quite different degrees, according 
to its specific characteristics. Thus “the state is, for the time being, the only legitimate 
context within which relative deprivation can be addressed through redistributive policies 
and practices”, and “it is at the level of states only that the principles of distributive justice 
can and may apply, as it is on this level alone that we have the institutional means to 
legitimately take from the rich and give to the poor”. For good or for worse, people will 
belong to separate states for a long time to come, rather than being simply citizens of the 
                                                  
68  Collier, 2007b, p. 8. This finds a counterpart in the transformation of trade and the economic basis, 
whereby actually “80 percent of developing countries exports are manufactures, and service exports are also 
mushrooming.” (Ibidem, p. 81.) 
69  See Milanovic (2008). Owing to the very high relative premium of changing country in relation to the 
restricted probabilities of advancement by remaining in a poor country, the pressure to migrate must be 
very high from poorer countries, especially towards rich countries where income distribution is more 
egalitarian (supposing the expected destination of the migrants to be mostly in the lower distributional 
range of the countries of immigration). In turn this may contribute to bring about a lesser egalitarian 
distribution in the receiving countries, in particular because of lower propensity towards redistribution and 
interclass solidarity as a consequence of increased ethnic differentiation and the immigration pressure. 
70  See Nel (2006), pp. 697-698 and the literature quoted there. 
71  Collier 2007b, p. 21. According to Collier some international charter agreed among all main industrial 
partners requiring  greater transparency in the conditions of exploitation of natural resources, and the 
utilization of the rents thereof, would be of great help in improving the way in which those revenues are 
spent. To the obvious objection that China’s unconditional scrambling for the underdeveloped world’s 
natural resources would break any conceivable charter, Collier’s rather unpersuasive counterargument is 
that “The West has to offer China greater inclusion in power in return for adherence to international 
standards.” (Ibidem, p. 146.)  
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world, and this will limit the degree of solidarity and redistribution at the world level.72 John 
Lennon’s utopia of Imagine there's no countries …. Nothing to kill or die for -- And no religion too is 
unfortunately very far off.73 
4.3.3.1 Breaking the actual international economic order with the violence of 
the worse off 
We have seen that a suitable alternative to the basic principles of the actual 
international economic order and to increasing globalization does not seem to exist. As to a 
general process of income redistribution among the states of the world, this seems utterly 
unrealistic (and not necessarily productive of a substantial betterment of the situation of 
the worse off of the world). But let us suppose that redistribution is forced by the less 
developed countries through violence, analogously to what has often happened in the 
historical past, when the civilizations of the Middle East, South- East Asia and Europe 
were invaded or taken at ransom by warlike “barbaric” peoples coming down from the 
fringes of the civilized centre. Could a forced world redistribution through violence be 
achieved? Let us suppose that conquest and domination by the less developed could be 
achieved through the unwillingness of the more developed to resort to the means available 
to defend themselves (such as for instance the use of atomic power). Could this bring 
betterment and prosperity to the masses of the poor of the world? This seems hardly a 
possibility. The idea that an advanced country, whose main wealth is the stock of its human 
capital could be run through domination and violent coercion to the benefit of some 
conqueror, much poorer because endowed with much less human capital, does not seem 
realistic.74 And it seems also unrealistic that under some hypothetic circumstances the 
ruling elite of the conquering state would exert its exploitation of the conquered to the 
benefit of the poor of their state rather than of itself. We shall return later on these issues  
4.3.4 The problem of the “fragile” states 
A related problem to which no easy solution can be seen is that of the so-called 
fragile states, “countries with particularly weak governance, institutions, and 
capacity…often in conflict”75 (where either internal or external conflicts are often at the 
origin of “fragility”), which did not partake of recent world economic growth, and are 
plagued by particularly severe problems of extreme poverty, high child mortality, and 
illiteracy. Short of neo-colonialist endeavours, which could hardly be a choice, the only way 
seems to hope that, favoured by the impact of globalization and institutional imitation, and 
possibly through the help of the international community, their internal dynamics could 
evolve so as to bring about a more favourable environment, in particular through the 
overcoming of the violent conflicts often at the origin of “fragility”. Indeed, as argued by 
Collier (2007b, p. 31), a greater participation in peace keeping by the international 
community, in order to reduce the probability of conflict reversion, could be the best form 
of aid. As to peace enforcing, and nation and institution building, this is a much more 
tricky issue, because of its neo-colonialist connotations and implied violation of national 
                                                  
72  Cf. Neal, 2006, pp.702-703. 
73  On the other hand to have peoples belonging to different sovereign constituencies (“states”) can be 
optimal if people are clustered in groups with distinct culture and preferences (cf. on this Muller 2005), this 
means until “globalization” will eventually have unified culture and prevailing preferences all over the 
world. But even in this case some technical problems of managing very large constituencies could lead to 
the optimal subdivision of the world into distinct sovereign states.  
74  See Simon (1989), p. 175. 
75  World Bank (2007, pp. 2-3). 
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sovereignty, lack of consensus by the international community, and lack of volunteers to 
offer the needed resources and face the inevitable losses and expenditures. The history of 
humanity is a long history of horrors. We surely cannot do anything about the horrors of 
the past. Probably we cannot do much about the horrors of the future. Only a delirium of 
omnipotence can lead us to believe that we should be able to deal with all the horrors of 
the present. We may just be left with the solution of ending the patronizing approach,76 
leaving fragile states to do their own experiences, as everybody else has done in the past, 
and learn through generations how to progress, forming and changing their own 
institutions. But our world has become much more impatient with historical time, the 
perceptions of contemporary horrors is enhanced by the spread of information and of 
visual representation all over the world, and we have become used to the idea that, by 
resorting to appropriate techniques, reforms, and interventions, we could solve all human 
and social problems. Moreover a country’s internal disturbances may severely impact on its 
neighbours, not only as a consequence of the collapse of trade following the collapse of the 
economy, but especially by originating massive sudden  s, and by the spreading 
abroad of internal disturbances, as well as diseases.77 We may just remind the disastrous 
consequences of Ruanda’s internal conflicts on Congo/Zaire or, quite recently, of 
Mugabe’s autocratic follies for the internal peace of South Africa, and of the internal 
conflict and absence of a state in Somalia for the safety of sea routes. A paradigmatic case 
is the massive influx of refugees (estimated at 11 million) from Bangladesh to India after 
the Pakistan military repression in 1971, amounting to “demographic aggression”, and 
prompting the Indian intervention in the conflict, resulting in Bangladesh independence.78 
The consequences of failed states on the outside world can be indeed very severe, even if 
only the economically measurable aspects are taken into consideration.79 
4.3.5 Migration 
A way to mitigate the plight of the worse off, as well as of remedying the injustice 
of the strict interrelation between somebody’s place of birth and wastly different life 
prospects, could be to allow unrestricted immigration from the poorer to the richer 
countries. Indeed, “controlling for country of birth, country of education, years of 
education, work experience, sex, and rural-urban residence” the real wage an average 
migrant worker receives in his home country is only a fraction of what he may receive in 
the United States,80 or indeed in almost any OECD country. So long as the wage 
differences reflect differences in productivity this also implies an obvious massive 
inefficiency in the world allocation of manpower. For the average worker of a poor 
country, the difference is enhanced by the much lower probability that somebody born in a 
poor country can achieve the same degree of education as one born in an affluent one. 
Considering the huge differences in per capita incomes and living standards, and that the 
prospect of improving one’s lot in a poorer country is bound to be much greater through 
                                                  
76  The latter is exposed and lamented by Easterly, and others (cf. Easterly, 2006, pp. 26-27). 
77  Cf. Collier, 2007b, p. 31. 
78  Cf. Marwah, 1979, p. 560. 
79  According to a rough estimate by Collier (2007b, p.103) the “costs of a typical civil war” are around $ 64 
billion. Collier’s quantitative analysis, as well his favourable attitude to peace keeping and peace 
enforcement, are severely criticized by Easterly (2007), according to whom “If Collier’s statistical analysis 
does not hold up under scrutiny, unfortunately, then his recommendations are not a reliable guide for 
deploying foreign aid, technical assistance, or armies. Economists should not be allowed to play games with 
statistics, much less with guns” (p. 1476).  
80  Clemens et al. (2008). 
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emigration than through internal advancement81 we may easily understand why the pressure 
towards immigration in the richer countries appears almost irresistible. Taking into account 
the overall number of the world poor, one can appreciate the enormous migratory 
potential towards the more prosperous (or even the less poor) countries in a shrinking 
world, with potential far-reaching social and political consequences. Countries of 
emigration become at the same time countries of immigration from even poorer countries, 
such as notably in the case of Eastern Europe as a whole, or of North Africa.82 In the usual 
model of international trade free migration leads to greater efficiency (in the sense at least 
of the principle of compensation:: those who are gaining gain more than what others are 
losing), but the political and social consequences of unrestricted migration in the 
immigration countries, which could deeply affect the social fabric, and thus the conditions 
of production, investment, and exchange, are not considered. At present those who 
succeed in reaching the heaven of a richer country have at least a heaven where to turn on. 
If present world heavens were reduced to hell, reproducing the illnesses of the countries 
from which people are flying, there would be no heaven anymore. Indeed, in case the 
obstacles to immigration were drastically reduced by abolishing the administrative 
constraints, as seemingly advocated by Bhagwati,83 and more or less explicitly by many 
others,84 the logical consequence would be an intensification of migration flows, up to the 
point where the worse off in the better off countries are about as good off, or rather as bad 
off, as the worse off in the worst off countries. In theory, following massive migration the 
lot of the inhabitants of the worse-off countries could improve, because of lower pressure 
on national resources, and reduced labour supply, to the point of stamping off further 
massive migratory pressures. O’Rourke, 2004, considering the experience of the great 
migratory flows out of Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arrives at the 
conclusion that” emigration is a self-limiting process”, since it brings about a reduction in 
the gap between the wage levels of the source and of the receiving countries. This cannot 
be generalized to the present situation, however, because of the huge gap in living 
standards, much higher than during the historical period of the great transatlantic 
migration, the present great differences in demographic potential, the lower relevance in 
the present world of the population pressure on agricultural resources as an inducement to 
emigration. In practice, under the present circumstances the consequences in the richer 
countries of a sustained period of unrestricted immigration could be disastrous for equality 
and social cohesion, possibly leading to the same degree of ethnic violence plaguing the 
most unfortunate of the developing countries, with negative economic consequences, 
which could reverberate disastrously on the poorer countries themselves, since trade and 
other interaction opportunities would be negatively affected.85 But such an outcome is 
rather theoretical., since at a certain stage of the process the tensions of a sudden massive 
immigration would lead to the introduction of measures for its further containment. After 
                                                  
81  See above p. 20. 
82  On South-South migrations see Hujo and Piper, 2007. 
83  Bhagwati, 2007, pp. 217-218. 
84  Quite often whatever limitation to immigration flows is blamed for its unsavoury (and to some extent 
inevitable) humanitarian consequences, without explicitly advocating free immigration. But to criticize any 
limitation to immigration flows logically amounts to the advocacy of unrestricted immigration. 
85  For a discussion of the issue of what the overall consequences of unrestricted immigration could be, see 
Chilosi, 2002. 
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all, no country in the world does admit free immigration. As Bhagwati himself reminds us 
(2007. p. 218) “immigration restrictions are the flip side of sovereignty”. 
As told before, a different prospect on the effects of international migration is 
conveyed by the experience of wholesale migration from the Old to the New World during 
the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, such as, for instance, recounted in 
O’Rourke (2004). But in those times the main economic activity was agriculture, and 
migratory flows were directed towards territories that were sparsely populated and 
endowed with plentiful natural resources, from countries where the density of population 
was much greater. Moreover there were probably no significant differences in human 
capital between the inhabitants of the European Offshoots and the European migrants. As 
a consequence migration served the development of overseas territories (at the expense of 
the original inhabitants), while acting toward wage reduction there, and resulted in a 
betterment of living conditions and in an increase of wage rates, as well as in a dramatic 
reduction in inequality at home, so that emigration acted as “a self limiting process” 
(ibidem, pp. 9-10). Present conditions are quite different. Often migration is from less 
densely populated to more densely populated countries (such as from Africa to Europe, or 
from CIS countries towards central and western Europe). Agriculture, and especially small 
scale agriculture, where decreasing returns are particularly important, does not have the 
relevance nowadays that it had in the previous centuries. The scarce resources that hold 
down development are not in general natural resources,86 but rather human and social 
capital, and this scarcity is not cured by emigration to more advanced countries. Some relief 
could be derived by the degree of migration that the richer countries are ready to accept. 
But the consequences of migration for those left in the poorer countries are by no means 
straightforward. On the one hand there are the advantages of the remittals, and the lower 
demographic pressure on scarce natural resources and the environment, on the other 
potentially huge losses of human capital. The latter however could be partially 
compensated by the brain gain of return immigrants87 and the transfer of knowledge and 
ideas that some systematic contact with migrants abroad, favoured by the extraordinary 
development of communication networks, can conjure. 88 
Even if the potential for migration lies in the huge differences in per capita incomes 
between the rich and the poor countries, it not really true that a lessening of migratory 
pressure could derive from some increase in the living standards of the latter. Up to a 
certain point the contrary could well be true. Emigration, in particular illegal emigration can 
be very expensive in relation to the living standards of the poorer countries. If those 
standards increase, the resources available for financing immigration increase too. As a 
                                                  
86  Indeed abundant natural resources have been long believed (see Mun, 1664), and are believed now too, to 
act as a potential drag to development, increasing the tendency towards corruption and rent seeking.  
87  Cf.  Mayr and Peri, 2008. 
88  “The emigration of skilled labor may not be negative for the sending country. In the first place, emigration 
of talent may provide a positive signal that motivates others in the sending country to acquire more 
education, thereby raising human capital and possibly promoting growth. Second, emigrants may, in due 
course, return or, through networks and resource repatriation (such as through remittances), provide 
essential inputs to new businesses and activities in the sending country. Third, emigration may actively 
promote a more effective flow of knowledge and information. Fourth, the changing nature of mobility—in 
part due to major advances in communications technology—may be limiting the extent to which skills are 
actually lost “ (Commander et al.,  2004, p. 236). On the other hand “studies of return migration suggest 
that those who return may be those that have performed relatively poorly when abroad; the best migrants 
tend to stay” (ibidem, p. 259). 
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consequence migration pressures may increase rather than decrease. In the end the relation 
between relative living standard and emigration can have the usual shape of a inverted U 
curve, so that in order to be able to dampen immigration pressures the increase in the 
living standards of the poorer countries needs to be substantial. Looking back to history. 
this is compatible with the fact that  in the nineteenth century “mass emigration started 
earlier in the richer countries of north-west Europe than in the poorer countries of 
southern and eastern Europe” (O’Rourke, 2004, p. 9). In particular, during the Irish famine 
emigration from Ireland to the New World was stronger from the richer than from the 
poorer counties (ibidem). The increasing immigration pressures of recent times could be a 
manifestation, not only of the great distress that a number of countries of emigration are 
facing, or of increasing “globalization”, or of the remittances and support of previous 
migrants reducing migration costs, but also of the overall economic progress of the 
underdeveloped world, especially during the past two decades.89  
5. Soul-searching and self-bashing 
Tied to the issue of the evaluation of the present economic order is the issue of the 
historical responsibility of the West in the plight of the Rest. Overall the impact of the 
West has been mixed.90 On the one hand it has played with greater efficacy, owing to its 
recent technological and organizational superiority, the same deadly games played by most 
of humanity for most of the time. On the other it has spread modern social and 
technological innovations, with dramatic long-run consequences in terms of improvement 
of the economic and living standards of most of the Rest. It has also spread its germs, with 
a deadly impact for some populations, in particular in South America.91 But in the historical 
interaction of peoples it is difficult to do cherry-picking: the same technological and 
organizational dominance that has made the West deadly for some has brought about the 
improvement of the living standards of the many through almost universal imitation. 
How much are the plight of poorer countries and the affluence of richer ones due 
to colonialism? And how much is the misery of Africa in particular a consequence of the 
transatlantic slave trade? How much does the responsibility of the latter fall on European 
shoulders?  
5.1 Colonialism 
Branko Milanovic has recently produced an interesting inquiry into the first issue 
(Milanovic, 2005a). According to his quantitative analysis on a large historical statistical 
data base, colonialism has not appreciably helped nor damaged on balance the economic 
development either of colonial powers or of colonies.This is consistent with the fact that 
                                                  
89  The absolute level of per capita incomes in the developing world as a whole has kept  increasing even in 
the “lost decade” of the eighties, and growth has accelerated in the  nineties, reaching quite respectable 
levels in  the first decade of the new millennium. The performance has been quite unequal, and the 
aggregate indicators have been disproportionately affected by the strong performance of China and India 
(both strong emigration countries with great demographic potential; see White and Subedi, 2008). But per 
capita incomes in all the areas of the less developed world have on the whole kept increasing, together with 
its population, another source of immigration pressure, albeit at quite unequal speed (cf. the “Key 
Development Data & Statistics” at the World Bank internet site: http://www.worldbank.org/). On the 
progressive intensification of migratory processes and their quantitative assessment see Oecd (2009) and 
Oecd (2008).   
90  For a concise assessment of the mixed impact of the West on the Rest, cf. Woodruff, 1983 [1966], the 
“Epilogue”, pp. 335-341. 
91  See Woodruff, 1983 [1966], p. 340; Diamond (1997). 
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“colonies accounted for only a minor share of the trade and investment of developed 
countries in the nineteenth century, and most of the greatly expanded world trade and 
investment was carried on within the developed bloc itself” (Easterlin, 1996, p 2). “In the 
half century before World War I the market for developed countries’ exports were chiefly 
in other developed  countries, and the principal suppliers of primary products requirements 
of the developed countries were other developed countries…Considering Great Britain, 
France, and Germany together, on the eve of World War II, their own Third World 
colonies accounted for only 11 percent of their merchandise trade and 12 percent of their 
foreign investment” (ibidem, p. 43).92 One must also consider that the advantages of 
empire, the exploitation of the colonies to the benefit of the metropolis, must be balanced 
with the costs of empire, military, human, administrative, and of infrastructural investment. 
At the same time colonies were usually long term beneficiaries, albeit in different measure 
according the type of colonial domination, of infrastructural investment and of the 
importation of modern technological and administrative innovations, and could benefit 
from the opening to the international economy. 93 In particular the colonial status did not 
hinder the fast development of the European Offshoots. Milanovic study confirms 
Bairoch’s view concerning the lack of noticeable positive consequences of colonial empires 
on the economic development of the metropolis. Indeed, as Bairoch remarks (p. 673), if 
one looks at the growth performance of European countries in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries those who grew the most were the countries without colonies, and this 
applies even more to the USA (p. 674). As far as colonies are concerned, Milanovic’s 
inquiry considers the growth performance of former colonies before and after 
independence, in relation to that of the rest of the world, and no particular change is 
detected after independence.94 But an interpretation could be that on average an 
exploitative structure is substituted to another. Thus one is left then with the question 
whether the responsibility for accommodating the country along an exploitative path could 
be attributed to the colonial rule itself. According to Bairoch (p. 665) the economic 
development of the colonies was damaged by an exploitative “colonial pact” to the benefit 
of the metropolis (pp. 665-668). One is however somewhat puzzled by the fact that this 
“pact”, hindering the development of manufacturing industry in the colonies, applied also 
to the colonies of European settlement (p. 667): it does not seem that the development of 
the “Western Offshoots” did suffer because of this in the long-run, as purportedly 
happened to the third world colonies. In a sense this is an issue of counterfactuals: what 
would have happened if there had been no colonial rule. There are some reason to suppose 
that the persistence of pre-colonial regimes would not have led to greater economic 
progress.95 Perhaps the only way to answer this question is to look at the different 
performance of countries and territories that were not subjected to colonial rule vs. those 
that were subjected. Unfortunately the sample of the latter is rather limited. It could be 
enriched including those territories that were independent since long (say Haiti or Liberia) 
to be compared with those that achieved independence since the 1960s. Perhaps the only 
obvious conclusion that can be reached is that the colonial territories that were subjected to 
                                                  
92  Cf. also Bairoch, 1997, pp. 675-678. 
93  On this see Bauer, 1969, pp. 53-55. 
94  Even more, as shown by Milanovic  (2005b, pp. 61-81) an overwhelming number of former colonies, in 
particular the African ones, fared quite badly after independence, much worse than under colonial rules, 
with dismal economic consequences. 
95  See Bauer, 1969, pp. 56 f. 
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massive population transfers from Europe (the “Western Offshoots”) fared even better 
than the metropolis, while those populations that, because of remoteness or inhospitable 
territories, were immune to the colonial encroachment continued their ancient modes of 
living, with all its advantages and disadvantages. Some additional casual remarks may be in 
place: Thailand, that remained independent, fared rather well in the long run, but no better 
than their previously colonized neighbours, such as South Korea or Taiwan or Malaysia. 
Japan, that underwent the near-colonial shock of Commodore Perry’s intrusion in 1853 
fared very well and became a powerful industrial country, part itself since 1895 of the world 
of colonizers. Haiti, which was independent since the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
fared badly, much worse than other Caribbean nations which gained independence more 
recently. Of course, even in the more favourable cases, colonization, aside from the 
distasteful aspects of foreign domination, leads to a deep intrusion in the very identity of 
the colonized peoples. But to the same analogous intrusion and estrangement from their 
traditional heritage leads the globalization of our times. When one refers to the 
responsibility of colonialism one has to deal with this kind of questions for which it is not 
easy to produce a plausible answer: would have the countries colonized fared any better 
without colonial conquest? Would the alternative to colonization by western powers have 
been peaceful progress rather than continuous backwardness, persistent violence and 
frequent wars? As far as the impact of colonizers on the latter issue is concerned colonial 
domination brought in general some kind of colonial peace, whereby the frequent 
murderous pre-colonial wars were restricted and some kind of order maintained by the 
colonial power, even if the imposed order on the colonized peoples was of quite different 
nature according to the quality of the colonial rule.96 
Moreover colonialism has a long history, much before western colonization: indeed, 
“colonization is a constant feature of the history of mankind.”97 All the empires of 
antiquity, up to the more recent Arab or Ottoman empires were colonizers before western 
colonialism, partaking with the latter the following features (singled out by Bairoch) 1. the 
imposition of the civilization of the colonizers; 2. the subordination of the colonies to the 
interest of the metropolis; 3. ethnical and religious discrimination.98 
However repulsive for our modern sensibility is the imperialist idea to conquer a 
militarily weaker territory and rule it by force in the interest of the conqueror, the countries 
that were conquered and subjected to colonial domination were not usually peaceful 
prosperous heavens. By and large the West and the Rest were players of the same historical 
game, of violent territorial expansion and domination, war, plunder, and conquest, that 
                                                  
96  See for instance the difference between the much better order imposed by the Canadian government that 
tended to respect the treaties struck with the indigenous tribe,s “by regularly delivering the commodities 
and cash annuities promised and by preventing white encroachment”, from that in the United Stated, where 
Indian treaties were not respected and where “if funds were available, they were often skimmed by corrupt 
officials and traders” and where “grazing or squatting on Indian land was ignored or even encouraged”. “By 
and large, Canadian justice was even handed; both white and Indian malefactors were caught and 
punished”, while “in the U.S. and Mexican realms, crimes committed against Indians went unpunished or 
were punished less severely than similar offenses against whites” (Keeley, 1996, pp. 154-155). There is no 
need however to remind the genocidal “pacifications” of local populations, either involuntary through 
germs, or voluntarily through mass murder and eradication (such as in the notorious case of German 
Namibia).  
97  “La colonisation est une constante de l’ histoire de l’ humanité. L’ histoire de la colonisation se confond 
presque avec l’ histoire universelle.” (Bairoch, 1997), p. 548. 
98  Bairoch, 1997, p. 549 
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only quite recently has been relinquished and declared illegal by most part of humanity.99 In 
the history of humanity evil has always been banal, or, even more, what we moderns 
consider evil was often not seen as such, or was simply cloaked under false pretensions, 
such as saving through conversion the souls of the infidels, as in the 1455 Papal Bull 
Romanus Pontifex, legitimizing the slave trade100, or King Leopold’s pretence to administer 
Congo for exclusive humanitarian purposes. The history of mankind is a dense collection 
of actions of the kind that nowadays are defined as crimes against humanity; even 
genocides can be extolled in sacred books as acts of pious obedience to God.101 As is often 
the case in what we may see as the progress of the moral awareness of humanity some 
activities that in an epoch are considered as legitimate, are subsequently perceived as 
crimes.  
5.2 Slavery 
Let us turn now to the specific responsibility of the West on slavery. Slavery has 
been practiced by humanity from time immemorial, and probably very few parts of the 
earth have been immune. Africa has certainly been no exception.102 Trans-Saharan slave 
trade in particular was practised to a large scale before the encroachment of the Europeans, 
but slave trade towards Asia was also substantial.103 With the advantage of European 
technology and organization, and pulled by the demand of the new plantation economies 
of the New World, slave trade reached from the sixteenth century onward unheard of 
dimensions. But in partaking blames and responsibilities one should consider that 
European traders were taking care (so to speak) of transport and marketing, while the 
actual production of slaves was the domain of the Africans themselves and, even before 
the transatlantic trade, the capture and trade of slaves was one of the main economic 
activities of Sub-Saharan Africa. If to the demerit and shame of the Europeans should be 
ascribed the massive extent of the transatlantic trade, to their merit and honour it must be 
attributed having made slave trade and slavery illegal, extending the prohibition of slavery 
to their colonial domains, thus bringing eventually to an end a time immemorial historical 
tradition of legal slavery and legal slave trade. 104  
                                                  
99  For the overall world picture see in particular Ringrose (2001). For an outline of the history of African 
autochthonous kingdoms and empires and of their wars, see Collins and Burns (2007). As to South America 
there is no need to remind the extreme violence characterizing the autochthonous pre-Colombian empires. 
For the usual bellicosity and extreme violence of the “peoples without history” on which colonialism 
encroached, see Keeley (1996). 
100 Maddison, 2006, p 60. 
101 Such as in the story of Saul and the Amalekites in the Bible. 
102 The oldest documentation of slavery in Africa dates back to 2900 BC (Collins and Burns, p. 202).  
103 Cf. Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 202-247; Maddison, 2006, pp. 574-575. Hellie, 2007. 
104 Notable were in particular the British 1807 “Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade" and the 1833 
“Slavery Abolition Act”. But sporadic measures for the abolition of slavery and or/slave trade were taken 
even before, such as the abolition of slave trade by Denmark in 1792, effective in 1803. In ancient times 
Cyrus the Great decreed the abolition of slavery in the Persian Empire in 539 BC, and the Chinese emperor 
Wang Mang in China at the beginning of the Christian Era. For a more comprehensive picture see Hellie 
(2007) or Wikipedia’s entry “Abolition of Slavery Timeline” (as of 14/9/09);. for the long path leading to 
the legal abolition of slavery in the twentieth century, see Miers, 2003, Bairoch, 738-740, 778-782. The 
last countries where slavery was legally abolished were the Arab countries: Saudi Arabia in 1962, 
Mauritania in 1981. Illegal or semi-legal slavery unfortunately still exists in many countries (besides Miers’ 
authoritative volume, see Bales, 2004, and Wikipedia’s entry “Slavery in Modern Africa”(as of 14/9/09)). 
For the persistence of slavery in Mauritania see Amnesty International, 2002. For the place of slavery in 
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6. The population explosion  
In a secular (or rather millennial) perspective, before the Industrial Revolution 
population growth was held in check by high mortality rates, which were accompanying 
high birth rates. The source of high mortality rates in a classical Malthusian perspective 
could have been the limitation in the amount of available agricultural resources, either 
continuously, leading to poor nutrition (and therefore to higher morbidity and premature 
deaths), or episodically, through famines. But there were also other forces at play.105 First of 
all very high rates of child mortality, either through systematic infanticide (itself probably a 
function of available resources), especially of females, or as a consequences of neglect and 
of poor living, childbearing, and childrearing conditions. Second, possible neglect of the 
elders, the disabled and the infirm. Third the spread of epidemic diseases (which was 
favoured by overcrowding and poor living conditions in the cities of agricultural societies). 
Then, endemic warfare, between tribes, nations or individuals, leading to direct deaths, 
spread of disease, as well as to misdirection and destruction of the resources otherwise 
available for survival.106 Still, following the improvements of agricultural technology in 
particular, there was some population growth at a very slow pace, slightly accelerating in 
time, as shown in table 6.107 Later on, especially since the middle of the nineteenth century, 
the decrease in mortality rates (a true “mortality revolution” “which has resulted in 
doubling or more of average life expectancy at birth”108 and has been the direct 
consequence of medical discoveries, and of the diffusion of medical knowledge, as well as 
hygiene, that has followed with some delay the Industrial Revolution) has led to a much 
faster population growth.. At the same time the demographic consequences of two world 
wars and related upheavals are shown in a temporary decrease of growth rates. The post 
World War II period has seen an unprecedented population explosion, indeed the rate of 
                                                                                                                                                
Islam and some contemporary authoritative opinions by Islamic scholars legitimizing slavery see the entry 
“Islam and Slavery” of Wikipedia (accessed 14/9/2009) and the sources quoted there. 
105 In Malthus’ own words: “The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, 
whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contributes to shorten the natural duration of 
human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour 
and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, 
the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine.” Malthus 1826 [1798], I.II.9. 
106 According to Ember (1978) about 60% of the societies of hunter gatherers of which there is 
documentation were recorded to be at war at least once every two years. Even more drastic is the picture 
traced by Keeley (1996) concerning the propensity to war and violence of ancient and modern pre-historical 
societies (pre-historical in the sense of “people without written history”). As to pre-industrial civilizations it 
is enough to recall world and European history (for instance, considering European history immediately 
preceding the Industrial Revolution, in the 16th century 95% of the time there were wars involving the 
major European powers, 94% in the 17th and 78% in the 18th century; cf. Eloranta, 2005). For a broad 
picture of the frequency of warfare in state and non-state societies see Keeley, cit., pp. 32-33, and the 
literature quoted there. For the issue of population control in pre-industrial societies, with a survey of the 
relevant literature, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
107 The relation between population growth and agricultural technology was stressed by Boserup (1965), even 
if in Boserup’s work the causal relation was supposed to act in the contrary sense than the one implied 
above; the crucial element being the density of population affecting the length of fallows. However this 
could be the case if a complete blueprint of alternative agricultural techniques were to exist at any given 
time, not if alternative agricultural techniques had to be discovered, or rediscovered, in a lengthy historical 
process. For a critical assessment of Boserup’s work, see Federico (2001). On the other hand Boserup’s 
argument could be reinterpreted as pointing towards endogenous technological progress in agriculture 
being stimulated by demographic conditions (see on this Cuffaro, 2001, pp. 67 f.).  
108 Easterlin, 1996, p. 1. 
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growth of world population has never been so high as after WWII. There are some signs of 
abating however following increasing living standards and progresses in the technology of 
birth control, spreading from the more advanced countries to the lesser developed areas of 
the world, leading to a forecast of a peak of about 9.2 billion around the year 2050.109 
What have been the causes of the post World War II world population explosion? 
Essentially the reduction in mortality rates and the increase in life expectancy (see the tables 
in the Statistical Appendix at the end). The birth rate has on the whole decreased in the 
post-war period, but the increase in life expectancy has been stronger; 17 years between 
1950 to 1999 in the world as a whole, more or less the same as in the first half of the 
twentieth century, three times more than the increase of life expectancy in the crucial eighty 
years of the spread of the industrial revolution, from 1820 to 1900. One may also note that 
all the areas of the world have partaken in the great advance in life expectancy,110 while the 
present inequality in average life expectancy between the different areas (about 50% 
between the highest, Western Europe, and the lowest, Africa), is much lower than either in 
wealth or in income (see the Statistical Appendix; with respect to some other vital statistics, 
however, the picture is more extreme). Moreover, “differences in lifetime survival rates 
between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor individuals within countries 
were much higher two centuries ago than they are now”, and “over the past century, the 
life span gap between poor and rich countries has narrowed dramatically” (Milanovic et alii, 
2007, p. 28 and p. 24). It is interesting to note, to understand what has been accomplished 
in the course of the very short historical span of two centuries that the worst off in terms 
of life expectancy, the “Africans south of the Sahara survive a bit longer today … (even 
including the impact of AIDS), than did the English in the early nineteenth century when 
they had the world’s longest life spans” (ibidem, p. 26). According to Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002, p. 741) the inequality in world life expectancy started to decrease from the 
beginning of the second quarter of the 20-th century, while the inequality in per capita 
income distribution continued to increase. One of the reasons of the population explosion 
in the post WWII period lies in the impact of the Green Revolution in third world 
countries, such as Mexico and India, leading to the strong growth of agricultural 
production, as well as in the improvements in transportation.111 There was no major 
demographic catastrophe, of the kind that in the old times were blocking demographic 
advance in a secular perspective.112 (For some relevant demographic data we may refer to 
the statistical appendix at the end.) 
                                                  
109 Cf. United Nations, 2006. 
110 Cf. tables 4A and 5A. 
111 With the “Green Revolution” modern agricultural techniques and high productivity seeds were imported 
from the developed world into developing countries through organized efforts spurred first by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (starting from Mexico in 1944), to which the Ford Foundation later joined forces. 
The result was that “the adoption of High Yelding Varieties (HYVs) enormously increased the productivity 
of land and labor” (Federico, 2005, p. 214). For comprehensive statistical data on agricultural growth see 
ibidem, pp. 233 f. However in a number of areas, in particular in Africa, and Latin America, the methods of 
the Green Revolution have encountered fundamental organizational and environmental obstacles (on this 
see Cuffaro, 2001, chapters 5 and. 6, in particular pp. 117 f.). But taking into account the increasing 
integration of the world food market, productivity advances in some countries can have a favourable impact 
on the food balance in others through their effect on world supply and prices, anyway. 
112 Such as in the case of the Black Death. The only globally relevant demographic catastrophe in the post 
War II period could have been a population deficit of an undetermined (and undeterminable) few tens of 
millions Chinese as a consequence of the famine following Mao’s Great Leap Forward: “a dip in the growth 
rate from 1959-1960… was due to the Great Leap Forward in China. During that time, both natural 
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Table 5. Yearly average rates of population growth 1-2007 (in percentages) 
 1-1000 
1000-
1500 
1500-
1820 
1820-
1870 
1870-
1913 
1913-
1950 
1950-
1973 
1973-
2001 
2001-
2007 
Western 
Europe 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.69 0.77 0.42 0.71 0.32 0.26 
Eastern Europe 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.77 0.92 0.26 1.01 0.32 -0.03 
Former USSR 0.06 0.17 0.37 0.97 1.33 0.38 1.44 0.54 -0.15 
Western 
offshoots113 0.05 0.07 0.44 2.86 2.07 1.25 1.54 1.09 0.94 
Latin America 0.07 0.09 0.07 1.25 1.63 1.96 2.73 1.96 1.3 
Japan 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.95 1.32 1.14 0.55 0.06 
Total Asia excl. 
Japan 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.55 0.92 2.19 1.80 1.29 
Africa 0.07 0.07 0.15114 0.40 0.75 1.64 2.37 2.69 2.36 
World 0.01 0.10 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.93 1.93 1.62 1.20 
Source of the data of the last column: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at 
http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/agggen; the remaining data are taken from Maddison 
(2006), p. 637.  
7. Maddison’s statistical summing-up of world economic growth 
Even in the poorest of continents, Africa, per capita income has strongly increased 
(about three times; an unprecedented performance) since the spreading to the whole world 
of the present mode of production that followed the industrial revolution (see Table 7). 
This has taken place notwithstanding the rapid population growth, which in the post World 
War II years has become the highest in the world (2.69% yearly in the period 1973-2001, 
somewhat reduced to 2,36% in the last six years; cf. Table 6).   
According to Maddison’s statistical account (somewhat daring, owing to the length 
of the historical period covered), per capita income has declined in Western Europe during 
the first 1000 years of our era, from 450PP$ to 400 (where 400 stays for the physical 
subsistence level), reaching a nadir around 600 AD, and then starting a very slow 
recovery.115 In that period the rest of the world fared slightly better, per capita incomes 
                                                                                                                                                
disasters and decreased agricultural output in the wake of massive social reorganization caused China's 
death rate to rise sharply and its fertility rate to fall by almost half” (US Census Bureau, 18/7/2007; the dip 
could be graphically seen in the sudden fall in the line of the population growth rate reported in the site of 
the World Population Clock). According to Yao (1999) the demographic deficit in the three years 1959-61 
was somewhat higher than 49 million, of which about 18.5 million extra deaths and the rest lost births. Not 
a big difference anyway to the size of world population at the time, of about 3 billion. For other estimates 
one could refer to the literature quoted by Yao, in particular Peng Xizhe (1987). 
113 USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia. 
114 One may be puzzled by the acceleration of the demographic development of Africa in a period of massive 
slave transatlantic trade. The answer seems to lie in the fact that “although some areas of Africa were 
depleted by slave raiding, on balance the African population grew after the establishment of the 
transatlantic slave trade because of new food crops introduced from the New World, particularly manioc, 
corn (maize), and possibly peanuts” (Hellie, 2007). Cf. also Collins and Burns, 2007, pp. 198-199, 311 (p. 
199: “The introduction of New World and Asian crops transformed many African agricultural societies, 
enabling them to expand into the vast unpopulated lands of the continent.”); Maddison, 2006, p. 569. The 
demographic consequences of the new crops were somewhat compensated however by the spread of new 
diseases brought by the Europeans (Collins and Burns, pp. 199-200). 
115 The data for the year 1 in Western Europe and Asia are considered implausibly low by Federico (2002, p. 
115). Federico’s viewpoint  is consistent with Milanovic (December 2004) estimate of 840 (p. 22) or 
between 800 and 900 1990 PPP$ (p. 23) as the average per capita income of the Roman empire at the times 
of Augustus. 
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being throughout the period somewhat higher in Africa (430 at 1AD, 425 at 1000AD), and 
in Asia (450 in both years), while the remaining reions were still at low subsistence level 
(400). Five hundred years later the world as a whole had made some modest progress (from 
436 to 566). Italy was by far the richest country with 1100PPP$, but was stagnating until 
the Industrial Revolution (1820). The territories that were to become the Western 
Offshoots were the poorest at 400, Africa had somewhat declined at 414, stagnating until 
the colonial conquests of the nineteenth century, China had progressed from 450 to 600, 
staying at that level until 1820 and declining afterwards, down to 439 in 1950, Japan also 
progressed reaching 737 in 1820. At the threshold of the Industrial Revolution, in 1700, the 
richest world country were the Netherlands with 2130, Western Europe was somewhat 
lower than 1000PPP$ on average.116 
 
Table 6. World Per Capita GDP, Regional Averages, 1-2001 AD (1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars)117  
 1  1000  1500  1600  1700  1820  1870  1913  1950  1973  2001  
Western Europe  450  400  771  890  998  1 204  1 960  3 458  4 579  11,416  19,256 
Eastern Europe  400  400  496  548  606  683  937  1 695  2 111  4 988  6 027  
Former USSR  400  400  499  552  610  688  943  1 488  2 841  6 059  4 626  
Western Offshoots 400  400  400  400  476  1 202  2 419  5 233  9 268  16,179  26,943  
Latin America 400  400  416  438  527  692  681  1 481  2 506  4 504  5 811  
Japan  400  425  500  520  570  669  737  1 387  1 921  11,434  20,683  
Asia (excl. Japan)  450  450  572  575  571  577  550  658  634  1 226  3 256  
Africa  430  425  414  422  421  420  500  637  894  1 410  1 489  
World  445  436  566  595  615  667  875  1 525  2 111  4 091  6 049  
Source: Maddison, 2006, p. 642. 
Economic growth has been accompanied, wherever data are available, by a great 
reduction, in many cases almost a halving, since 1870, of labour time (Maddison, 2006, p. 
347). And hence by an enormous growth of hourly labour productivity (p. 351). 
Notwithstanding the reduction in labour time, production per worker has greatly increased 
(about ten times since 1870 in Western Europe: Maddison, 2006, p. 349). Perusing the 
above data it becomes obvious that at the time Marx was writing Das Kapital no amount of 
redistribution could have ever brought about the dramatic improvement in the living 
standards of the masses that technical progress and development (“the development of 
productive forces”) would have brought about in less than a life-span. Thus Marx (1875) 
was right in downplaying the issue of distribution as such. Distribution may be important 
in the short-run for allowing some of the worse-off to improve their lot. In the long run 
for the worse off it is more important the relation between distribution, technical 
improvements, production and accumulation 
 
                                                  
116 For the detailed country data one is referred to Maddison (2006, p. 639). 
117 For a definition of Geary-Khamis dollars cf. United Nations, 1992. It should be noted that taking Geary-
Khamis dollars enhances the reported incomes in poorer nations because goods and services consumed by 
them are calculated at the higher international prices that are closer to those of the richer countries, where 
services are relatively more expensive, and thus understates the income inequality between nations. This 
depends on the Gerschenkron effect, whereby the national income of a nation is enhanced if calculated at 
the prices prevailing somewhere else, because in a country relatively more of the goods that are relatively 
cheaper are consumed. Cf. Dowrick and Akmal, 2005, Milanovic 2005b, p. 125. 
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Table 7 Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Regions, 0–1998 (annual average compound growth rate)  
 0–1000 1000–1500 1500–1600 1600–1700 1700–1820 1820–1998 
       
Western Europe –0.01 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 1.51 
Western Offshoots 0 0 0 0.17 0.78 1.75 
Japan 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.13 1.93 
Group A –0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.18 1.67 
       
Latin America 0 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.19 1.22 
Eastern Europe & 
former USSR 0 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.06 
Asia (excluding Japan) 0 0.05 0.01 –0.01 0.01 0.92 
Africa –0.00 –0.01 0 0 0.04 0.67 
Group B –0.00 0.04 0.02 0 0.03 0.95 
World –0.00 0.05 0.05 –0.00 0.05 1.21 
 
Source: Maddison (2006, pp. 30; 643).  
 
Table 8. Growth of Per Capita GDP by Major Region, 1820-2001 (annual average compound growth rate) 
 1820–70 1870–1913 1913–50 1950–73 1973–2001 
Western Europe 0.98 1.33 0.76 4.05 1.88 
Eastern Europe 0.63 1.39 0.60 3.81 0.68 
Former USSR 0.63 1.06 1.76 3.35 -0.96 
Western Offshoots 1.41 1.810 01.56 2.45 1.84 
Japan 0.19 1.48 0.88 8.06 2.14 
Latin America -0.03 1.82 1.43 2.58 1.84 
Asia (excluding Japan) -0.10 0.42 -0.10 2.91 3.55 
Africa 0.35 0.57 0.92 2 0.19 
World 0.54 1.30 0.88 2.92 1.41 
 
Source: Maddison (2006, p. 643).  
 35 
8. The very long perspective of the world economic history according to 
the Malthusian viewpoint 
 
Fig. 2. The Malthusian trap (“world economic history in one picture” ), according to Gregory Clark118  
 
A possible interpretation of available historical evidence is the Malthusian view. Up 
to the dawn of industrial revolution the great majority of humans were on the brink of 
physical survival. In a very long perspective there was by and large a Malthusian 
equilibrium between population and resources, with a very weak long run growth, 
amounting to near stagnation, of world population.119 Under such circumstances 
distribution of income and wealth affects in the long run not the living standards of the 
masses but the size of the population (because an unequal distribution uses up resources 
that could allow a larger population to subsist), but. At the same time the existence of 
privileged strata, which in the short run at least are somewhat out of the Malthusian trap, 
can affect the well being of the worst off through the externalities they generate. These 
could be negative (envy and the sense of relative deprivation) or positive (the hope, 
however slim, to be able to raise among the privileged, some identification with their 
interest and life experience, the possible cultural advantages that are mentioned below). 
Their relative impact may depend, among others, on the degree of mobility in the society 
concerned. Religion could surrogate mobility in this world with a belief in mobility in the 
afterworld. Even in the slave society of ancient Rome slaves had some degree of hope to 
be liberated, and even to become affluent or, in Christian times, to earn after death, alike 
their rich masters, and ever more than they, the Kingdom of Heaven. The existence of 
some strata that were able to enjoy a surplus over subsistence could have been an engine 
(however inefficient) of progress in living patterns, and an instrument for providing the 
resources for some to devote themselves to art, technology and science, with eventual long 
run benefits for average living standards, as well as cultural benefits for mankind.  
                                                  
118 Fig. 1.1 in Clark (2007). 
119 Clark’s 2007 book is a recent representation of this viewpoint. 
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Moreover if a priori, under the veil of ignorance, as in Rawles’ paradigm, one should have 
chosen two different possible societies where to live, one with a smaller population in 
Malthusian demographic equilibrium with inequalities, and another one with larger 
population in Malthusian demographic equilibrium with lower or absent inequalities, it is 
not quite clear that the choice would have been for the second alternative, given that to the 
first one, unlike the second, is associated some probability of finding oneself better off, 
once the veil of ignorance is dispelled, than in the egalitarian Malthusian subsistence 
alternative. Aside from nurturing a ruling elite, other surplus utilizations were for collective 
purposes, such as building cathedrals or waging wars, the latter possibly being in itself one 
of the principal instruments, through their disruptive consequences, as well as the directly 
inflicted deaths, of population control. The working of Malthusian limits could have 
affected economic progress negatively, pushing living standards down; however greater 
population density could have lead to more advanced production techniques and modes of 
organization, in particular through the division of labour and increasing returns to scale.120 
Moreover, even if the Malthusian trap had worked in the very long-run, in the shorter run 
there should have been long periods (such as after the Black Death) when population 
growth was compatible with some improvement in average living standards. Thus in the 
shorter run how wealth (land ownership in particular) was distributed could have made a 
great deal of difference for the well being of the bulk of the population. The pressure of 
population on resources could have been reduced by reducing the tendency to 
demographic growth, either by decreasing natality or by increasing mortality. Historically 
speaking the increase of mortality and reduction in life expectancy would first of all be 
based on infanticide, but also on high propensity to accidental death in later ages.  
8.1 The Malthusian mechanism under pre-agricultural conditions 
In particular looser or absent organized political power under pre-agricultural 
conditions could have made life more precarious and insecure, leading to higher adult 
mortality from violent deaths (which anyway would have been caused by such an 
hazardous endeavour as hunting with the available tools of the stone age), and consequent 
lower pressure on resources, thus allowing higher living adult standards than in later more 
densely populated agricultural societies.121 This could be a reason explaining the apparent 
paradox of the alleged lower living standards in  agricultural in comparison to hunter-
gatherers societies.122 In the latter people appear on average to be better fed and enjoy 
much more leisure. This could be easily explained if we consider that in principle in hunter 
gathering nomadic societies to hunt and collect more does not help to prevent starvation in 
hard times, since what is above necessities cannot be hoarded. The bottleneck to survival 
could have been the occasional times of scarcity. Whenever this does not occur there is no 
point in hunting and foraging more than what is needed for comfortable survival, taking 
into account the relation between possible yield and effort, where the former is reduced by 
the habit of sharing. At the same time, if less is foraged now, some more may be available 
in the future, especially if the foragers are able to reduce competition through defence of 
the territory against other groups. Another method to provide for the future as a kind of 
insurance (because of the expectation of reciprocating) is the practice of the sharing 
                                                  
120 In the development of agriculture this is stressed by Boserup (1965). 
121 For the propensity to violence and warfare of primitive societies and the consequent high death toll in 
proportional terms see Keeley (1996), pp. 28-29; 83-112. 
122 On this see Ember (1978); Diamond (1987); Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
 37 
through gifts, probably enhanced by the fact that whenever a good hunt occurs the excess 
over current consumption cannot be stored, and what can be stored cannot be easily 
defended if it arises the envy of the lesser fortunate. In turn this in primitive societies may 
weaken the incentive to work,123 and at the same time may reduce the extent of the 
exploitation of natural resources, avoiding the “tragedy of the commons”. In agricultural 
societies it pays to labour all year along (even if with different intensity according to the 
seasons) in order to minimize the occurrence of starvation, since provisions and the 
increased productive capabilities of the earth as a consequence of improvements are carried 
on in time. So the harder and longer is labour the higher the probabilities of survival. In the 
end the numbers that a given territory can sustain are much higher with agriculture, but the 
living stiles are possibly less pleasant. The same kind of considerations could lead to a 
possible basic Malthusian mechanism for controlling hunter gatherers populations: the 
occurrence of the occasional lack of food bringing about starvation of a usually adequately 
fed population particularly subjected, because of the lack of carry-over, to the vagaries of 
environmental conditions.124 The greater the population density and the higher the pressure 
on resources, the higher the probability of occasional starvation to occur. In addition, a 
reason put forward for explaining the possibility of better living standards of hunters 
gatherers in relation to agriculturalists is the lower population pressure because of the more 
limited fertility of the former, associated with their specific life style, as well as the possible 
negative consequences on fertility of the increased mobility associated with situations of 
penury.125 During the Neolithic Demographic Transition, on the contrary. the apparent 
increase in fertility may be explained by the shift towards the sedentary life stile of 
agriculturalists from the previous nomadic pattern of hunters gatherers, and possibly by 
new opportunities for the earlier weaning of infants.126  
8.2 Hunters-Gatherers and the Zen Economy  
According to an austere vision of the pre-agricultural societies, hunters-gatherers 
were in a Zen economy,127 where, even if people were living in absolute poverty according 
to our metric, they were quite well off according to another, assumed Zen-like metric, 
where the defining condition is the abundance of leisure and the satisfaction of limited 
wants. Interestingly, this corresponds to the condition of foraging animals in the wild (see 
Winterhalder, 1993); in both cases life could be endowed with leisure but at the same time 
rather short and precarious. Aside from the issue of absolute poverty, in terms of relative 
poverty hunters-gatherers societies could have been on the whole relatively egalitarian, so 
that in terms of relative poverty they were rich. On the other hand not all the hunters-
gatherers societies were egalitarian, for instance there were complex ones where a 
hierarchical organization and even slavery were present (see Fitzhugh, 2003).  
The myth of the "original affluent society” and of the extent of its leisure, as well as 
of its pretended favourable living conditions seemed very suitable to the 1968 cultural 
                                                  
123 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 314. 
124 Cf. Kaplan, 2000, p. 311: “One of the perennial problems confronted by virtually all hunter-gatherers is 
not only the seasonal variation in resources, but more significantly the periodic failure of all major resources 
… Unlike agriculturalists, foragers appear to be unable or unwilling to store resources in the good times to 
tide them over the bad times.” 
125 Cf, Bocquet-Appel and Bahr-Yosef, 2008, p. 5. 
126 See Bocquet-Appel and Naji (2006). Of particular interest is the wide discussion of the whole issue, and of 
the specific findings of the authors, by other scholars at the end of the article.  
127 Sahlins, 1968, p. 85. 
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environment where it was conceived, a modern economic version of Rousseau’s “Noble 
Savage” utopia. In more recent times a more sober reappraisal has been put forward. 
Kaplan (2000), in considering the living standards of one of the surviving foraging 
populations (the !Kung San of Southern Africa), sees rather strange to qualify as affluent “a 
society with a 50 percent childhood mortality rate and a life expectancy at birth of about 
thirty years”, not to speak of the particularly high death toll (in proportional terms) as a 
consequence of warfare of primitive societies.128 Part of the confusion may derive from the 
apparent better alimentary and health conditions shown by the bones of pre-historical 
hunters gatherers in relation to those of pre-historical agriculturalists.129 The inference of a 
worsening of material conditions (at least as far as alimentation is concerned) with the 
passage to agriculture are translated into the atemporal idea of the “original affluent 
society”, echoing the myth of an ancient blissful state of nature. 
9. The take off from the Malthusian Trap, the Industrial Revolution, 
Socialism and Transition 
Thus for almost the totality of human history affluence has been a tiny exception in 
a sea of misery and precarious lives. Therefore the real historical singularity that must be 
explained is not poverty and backwardness, but development and wealth. If the issue of 
relative poverty and underdevelopment arises from the economic development of the 
countries that have become well off rather than from some countries having been made 
worse off in an absolute sense, it is to the development of poorer countries that one should 
turn for addressing  the issue, as well as for reducing, and one day perhaps eliminating, 
absolute poverty. In a number of countries, particularly in Asia, the take-off has succeeded, 
in others, particularly in Africa,  it seems to have failed. 
The gigantic increase in population and wealth in the last two centuries, and the 
very rapid (historically speaking) decrease in the proportion of the poor have been the 
outcome of a mode of production characterized by the systematic application of scientific 
principles, and the organized pursuit of scientific and technological progress, dramatically 
improving the living prospects of billions of men and women, as a consequence of the 
basic “idea of the world as open to transformation by human intervention.”130 Its ultimate 
sources may be found in the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, tied together by the 
Reformation’s critical discussion of traditional received faith.131 Until the Soviet Revolution 
this mode of production took the organizational form and vehicle of transmission of the 
internal and international capitalist market. This does not detract anything from the role 
performed by the state, in particular as provider of public goods and infrastructure, but the 
basic principle of economic functioning has been voluntary exchange. It is on voluntary 
                                                  
128 See Keeley, 1996, pp. 88-94. 
129 Cf. for instance Cohen, 1991. 
130 Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 94. 
131The fundamental reasons of the “European miracle” and the precise moment of the European economic 
take-off from other advanced societies, such as in particular China, is a highly debated historical issue to 
which many huge tomes have been dedicated, since at least the issue was posed by Needham in the fifties. 
See for instance Jones (1981), Landes (1998), Pomeranz (2000). For a recent discussion of this issue, and a 
reference to the various viewpoints and bibliographical sources, see the thorough review article of Darwin 
(2008) by Adas (2009). Not all answers to the basic questions sound reasonable, in a number of instances 
reason, as often is the case, appear to become hostage to the desire to be original at all costs by presenting 
new alternative interpretations, however queer. In the text I am just hinting briefly to those explanations 
that seem more reasonable to me. 
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exchange, and the creation and expansion of markets, as made possible by the creation of a 
mercantile economy and the gradual establishment of the rule of law and clear attribution 
and protection of property rights, that the success of the Industrial Revolution and its 
aftermath can be attributed. In this may lie the difference with other environments of the 
past (such as historical China or the Arab world at its apogee) where scientific progress and 
innovations did not translate into sustained economic and technological progress. Real 
socialism can be seen just as a specific variety of this mode of production whereby the 
fundamental aspects have been upheld through a sort of rough extension of the rational 
organizing principle to the whole of society, and accumulation and innovation have been 
organized from the centre rather than having been the outcome of the working of market 
forces. Eventually this daring experiment has encountered a bitter dead end, but in the 
process it has partaken both of the increase in population and of the increase in aggregate 
production. Its failure has been a comparative failure, but still its achievements in aggregate 
economic and life statistical terms may be seen as substantial in relation to pre-industrial 
epochs. If we are willing to indulge a little bit in counterfactuals, suppose that real socialism 
had prevailed throughout the world by way of revolution and/or military conquest, 
destroying the international market system in the process. It is conceivable that after the 
initial disruptive consequences of the change of system some process of increasing world 
wealth and population would have persisted anyway, at very least by way of capital 
accumulation and technological diffusion in the lesser developed areas. Of course there is 
the issue as to the extent the survival of Soviet type socialism has been helped in practice 
by the contemporary existence of an international capitalist economy, from which to draw 
technology, as well as goods (such as foodstuffs) for whose production Soviet-type 
socialism was utterly disfunctional, and an international price system easing the difficult 
task of evaluating economic opportunities.132 But let us abstract from the latter point. 
Would it have been enough to argue, after the suppression of capitalism, that no better 
system than the socialist one is possible and to ascribe to the very nature of real socialism 
the economic and demographic outcomes? In this respect two viewpoints seem to be 
equally objectionable: that a really existing, and therefore highly imperfect, system of 
production must be rejected because its performance is seen as defective, and another 
abstractly implementable system (socialism vs. capitalism) should do better; as well the 
opposite contention that no better system of organization (in our counterfactual example 
capitalism vs. Soviet-type socialism) is possible.133 A further consideration refers to the 
heavy cost of transition, as borne out by the fall in per capita incomes, and, in the case of 
the former USSR, by the life statistical data.134 If compared with the case of China’s 
transition away from the Maoist system, this may exemplify the heavy toll of revolution as 
compared to evolution. Indeed transition in the former socialist camp has amounted to a, 
by and large pacific, but on the whole very disruptive, revolution led by institutional 
constructivism, the idea that everything can be explained by legal institutions, irrespective 
                                                  
132 Soviet-type socialism appears to have been much less proficient than capitalism in the production of 
consumer goods in general and in particular in the innovation of better consumer goods and better ways to 
satisfy consumer needs. The only innovative consumer goods developed in the socialist camp that comes to 
my mind is Rubrik’s cube, developed in Hungary in the mid seventies. However Soviet type socialism was 
by all accounts no inferior to western capitalism in the production and development of military hardware. It 
was much less efficient and much more profligate in its utilization of energy resources and raw materials 
(see on this Gomulka and Rostowski, 1988). 
133 Following Demsetz (1969) economists dub the first of the two views as Nirvana fallacy. 
134 In particular higher mortality rates and decreasing life expectancy, in particular of males. 
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of the social and historical environment where these institutions are nested. One may also 
think in this respect of a second best theorem (as a consequence of institutional 
complementarity): whenever institutions from a superior environment (in the sense that on 
its whole it brings about superior results) are introduced in an environment where the 
complementary institutions (which may well be of a tacit nature) are missing this can 
actually lead to a worsening, rather than to a betterment, of performance, until the 
complementary institutions are introduced, or a suitable adaptation of the overall 
institutional framework has taken place. Of course the issue of the best strategy of 
transition is a complex and most debated one. A crucial factor constraining transition 
strategies was of course the fact that the economic and political system in the European ex-
communist countries was rotten from the inside, and its credibility and social support was 
low, rendering a path of gradual economic reform difficult to follow. 
10. Post-war  development and the Malthusian trap 
As we have already mentioned, a most remarkable fact is that the world population 
and wealth have never grown so fast as in the post World War II period.135 We have 
considered the possible causes: globalization (in particular the great intensification of 
international trade and investment), technical progress (and the progress of medicine), 
originating in the European countries and Anglo-European offshoots; and the absence of 
devastating conflicts at the global level (the world has been on the brink of a nuclear global 
disaster, but it has not fallen into the precipice, yet). The progresses in transportation and 
agriculture have bee of particular importance for the provision of the basic means of 
survival; thanks to those progresses Woodruff’s speculation in the sixties that “if we are to 
be guided simply by statistics, then in AD 2000—i. e. in the lifetime of our children—
world population will have doubled and misery and starvation will stare mankind in the 
face” (op, cit,, p. 340) turned out to be correct only as far as population was concerned. 136 
Notwithstanding the above successes, for the world as a whole the Malthusian trap 
is still lurking.137 But rather than decreasing agricultural returns, as in the classical 
explanation, it may here be relevant the pressure on scarce natural resources,138 and in 
particular the threat against development and living standards of the possible “tragedies of 
the commons”, including climate change.139 The industrial and demographic developments 
that have accompanied the present relative prosperity have taken place at the cost of 
world’s commons, in particular at the cost of the decumulation in the span of two hundred 
years of huge reserves of fossil fuels, the leftovers of hundreds of millions of years of life 
                                                  
135 This is epitomized by the title of Easterlin 1996 book: Growth Triumphant. 
136 For the remarkable performance of world agriculture in modern times, but especially in the post-second 
world war years, when agricultural output growth was exceeding the most exceptional growth of 
population, see Federico (2005, p. 19). For the role of agriculture spearheading, alongside industry, modern 
economic growth, see Easterlin, 1996, p.5. 
137 The extent to which the Malthusian trap is lurking is however controversial. For an optimistic viewpoint 
see Simon (1981). According to Simon “another birth means another mind that can help think up ways of 
using resources more efficiently” (Lee, 2008). On the opposite side there is a vast intellectual current 
renewing the Malthusian tradition, such as by Garret Hardin, Albert A.Bartlett,  Paul Ehrlich, and the Club 
of Rome. 
138 Downplayed by Simon (1989), who optimistically sees in technological progress favoured by an increasing 
population the overall dominant factor. 
139 According to a plausible view, very specialized life stiles, such as in the contemporary world, increase 
population vulnerability to dramatic environmental changes; see Chu, 1998, pp. 193-194. 
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on earth.140 To this one may add the destruction of forests and pristine habitats, the 
pollution of air and water, and, last but not least, CO2 emissions. The plunder has mostly 
taken place to the advantage of industrialized countries, and of countries provided with 
large reserves of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), appropriating the rents of their 
exploitation. On the other hand the overall balance for poorer and energy poor countries 
cannot be considered as negative, since in the process their average living standards 
(considering both per capita income and vital statistics) have greatly improved all the same, 
as a consequence of the diffusion of the technological advances of the West, 
notwithstanding the colonial domination to which most of them had been subjected in the 
past. But as more and more countries successfully pursue the type of industrialization and 
economic development that has made the West rich and better off the emerging 
economies, the pressure on resources and the enhanced generation of externalities may 
exert a negative feedback elsewhere, especially on the living standards of the countries 
deprived of natural resources, with potential destabilizing consequences on the economy 
and the peace of the world. 
Extrapolating historical experience, the way out the Malthusian trap could lie on the 
one hand in the enhancing of technological progress, and on the other in population 
containment, lessening the pressure on the resource base (including the world commons). 
Population containment could be the outcome of a voluntary process, either at the 
individual and family level, following the demographic pattern of reduction of natality 
accompanying the development of the presently more developed countries, or it may be 
favoured by public policy; the possible alternatives are the usual ones that have constrained 
the development of population in history. Once demographic developments are considered 
an object of policy, some delicate philosophical problems present themselves: Is it better in 
presence of limited resources to have many overlapping generations with short lives, or 
fewer generations with longer lives? How short or how long, and how many generations? 
How many  people for each generation? Many people with low living standards, or few 
with higher living standards? And how low or how high?141 In this respect one should be 
reminded of the old saying “more souls more joy”. Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
population the greater the number of possible originators of new ideas and discoveries, 
from which the progress of humanity (however conceived) ensues, and the greater the 
number of possible contacts and personal interactions, favouring the development of 
ideas.142 At the same time there may be some trade-off between quantity and quality: a 
smaller better educated population could be more conducive to economic and intellectual 
progress than a larger uneducated one living at the margin of survival. Theoretically 
speaking we could also have a dynamic equilibrium à la Jules Simon, whereby high 
population growth spurs fast technological progress, the latter higher per capita incomes, 
                                                  
140 In this perspective the long run survival and spreading to the rest of humanity of the high living standards 
of the most developed world crucially depend on the successful untapping of relatively clean and plentiful 
new sources of energy, such as nuclear energy, either in the development of its fission or even more, 
perhaps, in its elusive fusion form. 
141 These dilemmas can be seen as brought to their extreme consequences in Asimov’s utopian world of the 
Foundation series (cf. in particular Asimov, 1986): As an alternative model to the crammed world of Trantor, 
the capital of the Galactic Empire, where 40 billion humans live in artificial domes, we have the very 
sparsely populated Solaria, where the population is controlled by strict demographic planning, with few 
(mutated) humans living very comfortably in very large estates worked by armies of robots. 
142 Cf. Simon (1981). 
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which would retroact in maintaining the momentum of technical progress and of 
demographic and economic growth, compensating Malthusian static decreasing returns.143 
11 The limits to population growth: natality, mortality, and catastrophes 
It is obvious however that a demographic explosion such as that of the last decades 
cannot last forever. Carlo Cipolla (1974 [1962], p. 86) quotes “an exercise in astronomical 
arithmetics” by C.P. Putnam (the inventor of the first giant windmill generation turbine, 
installed in 1941), according to which “if the [human] race had sprung from a couple living 
not long before agriculture was discovered—let us say 10,000 B.C.—and if its members 
had expanded at the rate of one per cent per year since then [which is lower than the 
present rate of growth of world population], the world population would form today a 
sphere of living flesh many thousand light years in diameter, and expanding with a radial 
velocity that, neglecting relativity, would be many times faster than light.”144 
A correction to the  demographic process leading to world overpopulation could be 
found in a decreasing birth rate, as a by-product of per capita income growth, and in the 
extension of social security systems in the countries where the survival of the elderly is 
otherwise dependent on family ties, as well as in the improvement and diffusion of the 
technology of birth control. Thus, according to Easterlin (1996), p. 112, “both theory and 
evidence indicate that the population explosion is a transient phase of contemporary 
development experience”, since in developing countries “the more rapid the Mortality 
Revolution, the more rapid is the transition to lower fertility”, replicating, albeit with 
different speed and modalities, the demographic transition of present developed countries. 
But can one really discount the possibility that the Mortality Revolution could intensify as a 
consequence of further medical discoveries after the transition to lower fertility is over, or 
that preferences regarding procreation could differ as a consequence of different cultural 
traditions in developing countries, or could change even in the developed world, altering 
the dynamic demographic balance?145 Neither preferences nor technology can really be 
considered as given in the long-run. The forecast of a levelling out of world population 
around 2050 at something more than 9 billion is at most a reasonable extrapolation of 
present trends, but of course only those who will be there at the time will be able to judge 
whether it is an adequate prediction of the future. 
The shape of a future long-run population equilibrium, absent a sudden 
demographic catastrophe, could entail a low mortality rate, a low birth rate, a long life span, 
and a marked increase in the average population age. Perhaps a senescent population will 
be less dynamic but wiser, and more endowed with experience.146 While we can think of 
demographic policies affecting the size of a population at the country level (even if a 
country could represent an important chunk of the world population, such as China), it 
                                                  
143 On the relation between population growth, technical progress, and per capita incomes see Kremer (1993). 
144 A more elementary calculation (2 multiplied by 1.01 elevated by 12000) would turn out an astronomical 
number of humans, with 43 digits. Their annual growth would be a number with only two digits less. 
Indeed, a more recent statement in this line of thought, by Albert A. Bartlett, is that “the greatest 
shortcoming of the human race is our inability to understand the exponential function” 
http://www.albartlett.org/ and thus, in particular, the physical impossibilily of exponential population 
growth in the very long-run..  
145 Indeed, there are signs that this may the case and that the long-run relationship between development 
fertility could be in reality j-shaped (cf. Myrskylä et alii, 2009). 
146 On the quality advantages of a more aged labour force see Easterlin, 1996, p. 124. For the economic 
consequences of population aging see ibidem, pp. 113, f. 
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seems hardly possible that demographic policies could be devised and implemented on the 
world level (such as advocated notably by Julian Huxley147) in order to take into account 
the important externalities that individual decisions regarding procreation have for the 
world as a whole.148 In the past demographic control, contrasting the operation of the 
Malthusian trap, was often ensured by custom, involving habits such as organized celibacy 
(as in monastic orders), repression of sexuality, and late marriages (the way out praised by 
Malthus himself), systematic infanticide, or belligerent habits leading to an increase of adult 
mortality.149 Under conditions of progressively increasing life expectancy demographic 
control could assume the form of some limitation to the length of life, if not explicitly and 
legally binding as in the dystopian world of the 10-th Victim,150 in the more subtle form of 
denying life supporting medical treatment and, possibly, the economic means of survival, to 
the elderly. 
Of the three factors that have historically contributed to hold populations in check 
through recurrent catastrophes: epidemics, famines, and war, the impact of epidemic 
diseases has been greatly reduced by the progresses of medicine and hygiene. Of course the 
possibility of the surfacing of some new epidemic disease, such as aviary influenza, is 
always possible, but only with temporarily limited consequences, until, presumably, medical 
research comes to grip with it. Mass starvation as a consequence of famine has been largely 
overcome by progresses in transportation and agricultural technique, with the possible 
exception of countries plagued by war and heavy internal conflicts. Even if at the moment 
tensions are re-surfacing on the international food market, following increased demand and 
the ill-advised subsidization of fuel producing crops, another agricultural revolution is in 
progress through the development of GMOs, which, notwithstanding misgivings and 
preconceived hostilities, seems essentially a foregone development. The impact of the new 
agrarian revolution appears more far-reaching and of potentially much greater impact than 
the previous one, because of the much faster process of scientific plant breeding, and the 
much greater potential of invention of new varieties suitable for the most varied 
environmental conditions.151 However, like the Green Revolution, and even more than the 
latter, the GMOs revolution also presents problems of compatibility with the various 
natural and institutional environments, especially in less developed countries. Obstacles to 
its spreading are presented by the specific nature of its associated private property rights, 
and consequent hindrances to imitation of privately owned know-how.152 The latter aspect 
                                                  
147 Cf. Julian Huxley (1964). Huxley is rather vague however on the instruments. Apparently the main 
instrument of population control that he envisages is the diffusion and promotion of the technology of 
birth control (p. 248: “When I say a population policy, I don’t mean that anybody is going to tell how many 
children she may have… It means that you recognize population as major problem of national life, that you 
have a general aim in regard to it, and that you try to devise methods for realizing this aim. And if you have 
an international population policy, again it doesn’t mean dictating to backward countries or anything of that 
sort; it means not depriving them of the right … to scientific information on birth-control, and it means 
help in regulating and controlling their increase and planning their families.”) Fictionally, there is far-
reaching demographic planning in Julian’s brother’s Aldous Huxley dystopian novel Brave New World (1932). 
148 A rather provocative and thought provoking discussion of the externalities generated by individual 
population decisions and the (un)suitability of a deliberate public policy aimed at affecting them is Friedman 
(1972). 
149 For an account of various methods of population control in different historical and anthropological 
settings, see Caldwell and Caldwell (2003). 
150 Petri (1965). 
151 See Cuffaro, 2001, p. 139 
152 Ibidem, pp. 136-144. 
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could be partly overcome through internationally concerted public action, involving in 
particular public, instead of private, funding of research. Moreover public international 
funding could provide an opportunity to direct research in areas which, while privately 
unprofitable, may contribute to stave off humanitarian crises, and help development, of 
poorer countries subject to environmental degradation. All in all the potentially most 
destructive factor, besides some sudden environmental disaster, could eventually be war, as 
a consequence of the spreading of atomic technology and of international tensions building 
up in an increasingly overcrowded and progressively shrinking world.153  
12. War, peace, the Bomb, and their economic consequences 
12.1 The economic consequences of war and peace in historical perspective 
Relative peace, maintained by the nuclear balance of terror, is seen as a crucial 
factor for explaining Post-War II economic achievements. “Capitalist peace” whereby 
countries interact though mutually advantageous voluntary exchanges excluding wars of 
territorial aggrandizement, which were endemic in the not-distant past, is another. Seen 
from the perspective of recent achievements, the game humanity played in the past, when 
conquest, plunder, territorial expansion and domination, slavery, torture and mass killings 
were respectable endeavours and part of the rules of the game, and mass murderers 
acquired the status of national heroes, still remembered and glorified in monuments and 
history books, has led on the whole to very poor results, as measured at least in terms of 
demographic and economic growth. However the real extent to which wars were 
contributing to hold in check the progress of humanity is difficult to gauge. 154 A strict 
Malthusian could object that living standards and population would have been held in 
check by other Malthusian factors anyway. On the other hand as an instrument of 
population control war was particularly wasteful. It produced destruction of capital, both 
physical and human (in particular the loss of adult males in their productive prime, while 
mortality from disease or starvation does affect first of all the children and the elderly). It 
required huge resources that could be alternatively used for collective surplus creation 
(which could be employed for productivity enhancement: for instance irrigation works) or 
for demographic enlargement. The latter could lead to economic progress, in a Boserupian 
perspective, or through the cultural mechanisms argued by Julian Simon. Personal trade 
interrelations and useful personal contacts between the belligerents are disrupted by war, 
with negative consequences on the economic base, and demographic sustainability, of the 
parties concerned. According to the socio-Darwinian vision, war is seen historically as an 
engine of natural selection of peoples and civilizations towards the progress of humanity;155 
but the selection provided by war has tended to bring to the fore populations and 
civilizations notable for their destructive and coercive power rather than for their peaceful 
civilized achievements. At the same time peaceful achievements could be to some extent 
                                                  
153 It is well known that overcrowding is a factor of aggressiveness in animal populations. Some tendencies of 
this sort could apply to human populations as well, especially if overcrowding leads to tension building 
processes such as massive migration flows and increasing pressure on natural resources. That demographic 
growth could lead to international tensions and open conflicts for getting control of natural resources is 
denied by Simon (1989). His arguments, pointing to induced technical progress especially in agriculture, are 
not really persuasive though, because he is simply assuming, extrapolating the past, the offsetting impact of 
induced technical progress in the future. 
154 For a quantitative assessment of the negative impact of war on growth in modern times, see Milanovic 
(2005a).  
155 Cf. Mueller, 2009, p. 7. 
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dependent on the ability to organize and exert some degree of coercive power: a relatively 
complex societal organization, such some ancient or modern empires, could be apt both to 
successfully wage wars and to peaceful and progressive purposes, as relative to the times. 
But this does not apply, for instance, to the fierce primitive hordes plundering and 
destroying ancient civilizations and complexly organized states. Here too the picture could 
change, once the hordes are settled and organize an empire on a territory that may profit of 
the relative stability provided by the rulers (such as in the case of the Pax Mongolica), at 
least until the next invasions, massacres and destruction, in an endless Penelopian weaving 
and destroying the thread of civilization.  
Whatever the reasons, until recent times the progress of humanity, both in terms of 
population and of productive achievements, has been so slow as to amount, in our present 
perception of time, to stagnation, with long spans of regression.156 The first millennium of 
the vulgar era was for Europe, from the economic viewpoint, a lost millennium: the 
decadence and fall of the Roman Empire and the dislocations following the barbaric 
invasions left Europe worse off in the year 1000, at the dawn of the new Christian nations, 
than at the time of the birth of Jesus Christ. Real sustained progress, meaning a substantial 
overcoming of the Malthusian trap (or anyway, whatever the interpretation, of the near 
long run stagnation, according to our modern perspective, in world population and per 
capita incomes), had to wait until the Industrial Revolution gradually spread all over the 
world. But it has been the peace period after the Second World War (localized conflicts 
notwithstanding) that has been accompanied by the greatest acceleration in the speed of 
demographic and economic advance the world has ever known in its history.  
12.2 The illegality of war 
Following the tragedy of two world wars the international community refuses the 
legitimacy of wars of aggression directed to the enlargement of national borders and the 
acquisition of new territories, which in the past were one of the most popular endeavours 
of nations and rulers and, if successful, were a source of glory and pride. In the post-war 
period, in comparison with previous times, expansionary wars have been on the whole very 
limited, and almost always restricted to less developed countries. In most cases they have 
been unsuccessful, a moderating factor having been the pressure exerted by the 
international community.157 It is not particularly tranquillizing however that the watchdog 
against wars of aggressions, empowered by the art. 39 of the Charter of the United Nations 
is a Security Council populated by revisionist powers, as well as powers that have been 
ready to spread through warlike means their political system (democracy);158 nor that the 
                                                  
156 An exception could have occurred during the Neolithic Demographic Transition when, according to 
some, population growth rates of 1% and more could have taken place for a sustained span of time (see 
Gary Warrick’s comment in Bocquet-Appel and Najit, 2006, p. 355; Bellwood, Peter and Marc Oxenham, 
2008, p. 22). With no improvement of living standards, however: as we have already mentioned the 
common opinion is that actually living standard were lower than under the previous pre-agricultural 
societies, because of longer work hours, less satisfactory nutrition, greater morbidity as a consequence of 
higher population density. 
157 Cf. Zacher (2001). For a detailed list of post-War II military events and of their territorial consequences 
see the table 2, “Interstate territorial aggressions, 1946–2000” (ibidem, pp. 225-228). 
158 Present revisionist powers are obviously Russia (willing to reassert its control of the former Soviet space, 
and de facto annexing after an act of war Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which theoretically were part of an 
independent Georgia), and China, keen to annex, possibly even by force of conquest, Taiwan, a de facto 
independent country, of which territory China lost control in 1895. The willingness of USA and UK to 
spread democracy by force on Iraq found some kind of justification in the intrinsic expansionistic nature of 
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provision of art 39 had a precedent in article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
but this, as well as the Kellog-Briand pact of 1928 outlawing wars of aggression, did not 
prevent Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (both signatories of the pact) attacking 
Poland in September 1939, thus triggering the Second World War. 
12.1.1 On the economic rationality of war 
In the past the natural productive foundations on which to re-start a growth 
process were largely unaffected by catastrophic events, as the foundation of wealth and 
survival was agriculture. Thus a war of conquest had some rationality).159 (as in the present 
world it may appear a war for controlling territories endowed with natural resources, such 
as hydrocarbons, or having a strategic location for their transport and control). This 
corresponds to the German Lebensraum concept, which however came to prominence in a 
period when agriculture had greatly reduced its relative importance in favour of industry, 
but which also encompassed the advantageous procurement through territorial expansion, 
in the mindset of the autarchic economy, of primary resources useful for industrial and 
military purposes. Under autarchy, territorial expansion could also be seen as a means of 
market expansion, a costly replacement for free international trade. In older times plunder 
and enslavement of the conquered could provide further reasonable motivations (obviously 
looking just at the economic viewpoint), and this historical experience was again not alien 
to Nazi warlike ideology and programmes. People and land were considered the 
foundations of the power and prosperity of states, of the capability to defend (and to 
enlarge) themselves and enhance the potentialities of surplus extraction.160 Things appear 
differently with the drastic change in the economic basis out of agriculture, and the 
advances, and increased destructive power, of military technology. The prosperity of 
industrial and post-industrial countries relies on very delicate social and economic 
mechanisms, and a much greater surplus may be enjoyed through voluntary exchange than 
through conquest and enslavement (even disregarding their costs). This was the argument 
raised by Angell (1913) on the eve of the First World War, declaring its impossibility on 
rational economic considerations: “It is impossible for one nation to seize by force the 
wealth or trade of another -- to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on 
another” (Angell, 1913, p. ix; along the same lines one may refer to Simon, 1989; and 
Gilpin, 981, pp. 132-133: “through specialisation and international trade an efficient state 
can gain more than through territorial expansion and conquests”). A recent contrary view is 
presented by Liberman, 1996. Liberman, drawing on a survey of historical cases, argues 
that “ruthless invaders can, in fact, successfully exploit industrial societies, as least for short 
periods of time.” But “the balance sheets evalutated [in his book] do not consider the costs 
of military conquest or economic sanctions imposed by states outside the empire…Mainly 
because other states balance against aggressors, conquest usually leads to disaster”(p. 4). 
Moreover successful exploitation requires ruthless coercion and repression (p. 5). On 
balance, it seems quite likely that the economic benefit of free trade may be highly superior 
                                                                                                                                                
Saddam Hussein’s regime and, possibly, in the conviction (on which we shall return later on) that 
democracies have a greater tendency to be on peace with their neighbours, so it would be to world peace 
lasting advantage to impose them by war. Even aside from the rather doubtful (and possibly foolhardy) 
endeavour of imposing democracy on countries with no democratic tradition, exporting democracy as well 
as preventing presumed future acts of aggression by force are illegal acts under the present rules of 
international law. 
159 On this point see Simon (1989, pp. 170-171).  
160 On this see Gilpin pp. 111-112. 170.  
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to the economic benefits of successful military conquest, even if the latter is accompanied 
by ruthless exploitation (in this may lie the often assumed tendency of free trade to lead to 
peace, while the latter instead could be jeopardized by trade barriers, which could give 
some justification to the merging of market through imperial conquest; see on this 
Liberman, 1996, p. 30, and the literature quoted there). But this is particularly true of our 
modern times when technological progress is particularly fast and the modern fabric of 
society particularly complex. One thing is to exert outside repressive control over mass 
production in large factories organized along tayloristic principles (such as it may have been 
in the historical cases considered by Liberman) under unchanging or slowly changing 
technology, another in the framework of modern post-industrial economies based on 
information technology and on sophisticated management of production and innovation, 
where about three quarters of National Income rely on the production of services in a 
context of rapid technological progress. The latter could be greatly hampered anyway by 
the kind of exploitative organization that Liberman is considering. It should be noted that 
the Liberman’s argument in support of the historical profitability of conquest is ambiguous. 
It refers rather to the “cumulativity” of the resources of the conquered to be used for the 
military power of the conquerors rather than for the economic welfare of the latter. 
Conquest, according to Liberman, could enhance military power through exploitation of 
the resources of the conquered by the conqueror government towards warlike endeavours 
favoured by making those resources available to the state. But trade may instead increase 
economic welfare, without its benefits being amenable to centralized control, especially if 
the opportunity for trade could be progressively enhanced by technological progress and 
increased productivity, while economic development, and so the growth of potential 
surplus, could be hampered by exploitative dominance. Thus exploitative dominance could 
have some attractive for authoritarian states, much less for democracies. This can be seen 
as a motive in favour of the idea that democracies are less conflict prone than other 
regimes. As far as internal conflicts are concerned the ballot seems a more peaceful method 
of government change than alternative non peaceful methods (such as revolutions, 
assassinations, or military coups). However the lower propensity of democracies to wage 
external wars has been recently challenged. According to Gartzke (2005, 2007), who 
elaborates and empirically tests Angell’s argument,161 it is the international capitalist market, 
rather than democracy, that works contrary to conflict in “capitalist peace”. On the other 
hand between advanced democracies and prosperous market economies embedded in the 
international economy there is an obvious overlap.162 
12.1.2 The economic irrationality of war  
Eventually, the war that Angell decreed as rationally impossible broke out, with 
catastrophic economic (not to speak of the non-economic) consequences for everybody 
concerned, putting a halt to the successful economic progress of the “belle époque”. War is 
indeed an eminently destructive endeavour, and often independent of rational economic 
considerations. And rational economic considerations may not be really important in 
waging a war: “In sum, studies of both the direct and the indirect influence of economic 
factors on the causation of war indicate that they have been much less important than 
political ambitions, ideological convictions, technological change, legal claims, irrational 
                                                  
161 As mentioned by Gartzke (2007, p. 170) a tendency for trade and free commerce to favour peace and be 
an obstacle to war was already identified by a number of previous authors, such as Montesquieu, Paine, 
Smith, Cobden and John Stuart Mill. For the concept of “capitalist peace” see Weede, 1999, pp. 66 f- 
162 Gartzke (2007, p. 182). 
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psychological complexes, ignorance, and unwillingness to maintain conditions of peace in a 
changing world”163. Moreover “not the facts, but men’s belief about facts, shapes their 
conduct”.164 Once Keynes wrote that practical men are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economists.165 We could extend the concept to international politics and war: men (and 
women) can turn out to be captive of the ideas and the examples, recounted and celebrated 
by historians, of ancient conquerors and warlike peoples, notwithstanding the change in the 
economic and political circumstances that should rationally lead to different modes of 
behaviour. Far from acting as magistra vitae history, especially doctored history, may become 
a time-bomb, to be handled with the utmost care. This may be seen to apply to the case of 
the wars of Yugoslav succession rekindling historical myths of ancient warlike prowess and 
incompatible territorial expansions, founded on past historical experience, compressed and 
actualized to the present times or, more recently, to the renewed imperial ambitions of 
Putin’s post-Soviet Russia. But history presents innumerable cases where the conscience of 
the heritage of the past brought about present blunders and destruction. A textbook case, 
not too far away in time, is the Italian Fascists’ grotesque striving to revive the past glories 
of the Roman empire.  
12.2 The economic consequences of the Bomb166 
The economic argument against war becomes much more compelling with nuclear 
technology. The spreading of nuclear armaments brings about a reduction in the propensity 
towards armed regional conflicts. After India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear status 
there have been moments of acute tension, but, unlike the past, none of these tensions has 
led to open war, but for the localized Kargil conflict on the Indian side of the Kashmir line 
of control in 1999, where the possession of nuclear weapons may have contributed to keep 
the conflict localized and to lead eventually to the withdraw of Pakistani forces.167 Since it 
has become a nuclear power, Arab countries have ceased to wage open war to Israel, with 
the exception of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the Israel presumed atomic capability 
may have weighted heavily on the extent of American support for Israel,168 and on the 
restricted aims of the Syrian-Egyptian offensive.169 Open direct conflicts between nuclear 
powers have been very rare and localized, such as the Kargil conflict mentioned above, and 
the Soviet-Chinese Ussuri conflict in 1969. At the same time, in case of escalation of 
hostilities towards a global conflict between atomic powers, the consequences could be 
disastrous, and not only for the countries concerned. The nuclear deterrent could be used, 
                                                  
163 Wright (1968, p. 463), quoted in Simon (1989, p. 5). 
164 Angell, 1913, p. ix. 
165 “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back” (Keynes, 1936, p. 383).  
166 For a survey of the debate on the consequences of the Bomb for international relations see Roth, 2007. 
167 CSIS, 1999. 
168 Cf. Farr, 1999, and the literature quoted by him. 
169 “Arab strategies and war aims in 1967 may have been restricted because of a fear of the Israeli ‘bomb in 
the basement,’ the undeclared nuclear option. The Egyptians planned to capture an eastern strip next to the 
Suez Canal and then hold. The Syrians did not aggressively commit more forces to battle or attempt to 
drive through the 1948 Jordan River border to the Israeli center. Both countries seemed not to violate Israel 
proper and avoided triggering one of the unstated Israeli reasons to employ nuclear weapons” (Ibidem). 
Even if the possession by Israel of a viable battle-ready nuclear capability was uncertain (see Roth, 2007, p. 
379), the mere possibility could have been enough to restrict the scope of the attack, even if not the attack 
itself. 
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instead than for maintaining a cold peace, as a safeguard against escalating a conventional 
conflict in a nuclear war. But waging a conventional war against another nuclear power 
under the deterrence of a nuclear umbrella, being confident that it will not escalate in a 
nuclear conflict could be a very dangerous game.  
In the present world the victory in a nuclear war could be a Pyrrhic one, since the 
conquered territories would stay contaminated and unproductive, 170 and the wealth of the 
defeated would be destroyed with their physical destruction, not to speak of the losses of 
the victor. Until now this entirely rational consideration (as well as the fear for the 
enormous losses of a nuclear war) has prevented all out wars between nuclear powers. But 
some kind of miscalculation as to the opponent’s response could precipitate a nuclear 
conflict. And unfortunately hate, which may be totally destructive, can provide a stronger 
motivation than greed. Indeed, the object of hate is in damaging or destroying the other, 
while greed amounts to benefiting oneself irrespective of the welfare of the others, but it 
does not necessarily imply their destruction. Sometimes it may even imply caring for their 
welfare, if their survival or collaboration is to the advantage of the greedy. In this respect 
we can add hate to the perspective of Simon (1989, p. 179), according to whom “Ironically, 
all haters of war should pray that humans are very materialistic in their motives, as 
compared to their devotion to their religious or cultural heritage, or even to aesthetic 
values, because sound calculation of the economic benefit-cost ratio of war would result in 
the decision not to begin a war.” Historically, intrinsic favourable attitudes towards war and 
against peace as such were also widespread, based on war being the occasion for displaying 
moral virtues and for performing heroic deeds, authoritatively represented, among others, 
in the works of prominent philosophers, from Aristotle to Kant (before writing Zum Ewigen 
Frieden), to Nietzsche (see Mueller, 2009, p. 2). In a sense war was in the past pre-atomic 
world the most preferred sport for engaging the physical contest of communities and 
nations, before the invention and world diffusion of football.  
12.3 The balance of power and the poison pills of the weak 
The return to the old days when the balance of power was ensuring a precarious 
equilibrium between “conservative” and “revisionist” powers entails enormous dangers: an 
international equilibrium based on the balance of power, rather than on basic commonly 
shared values (such as in the “pluralistic security community” of the West to which Russia 
could have become part if not for the drive towards authoritarian nationalism, or, in its 
words, “sovereign democracy”), may lead to war whenever the balance is altered, or is seen 
in the process of being altered.171 Moreover, the future may bring about the impossibility of 
having a balance of military power because of the net economic and military dominance of 
some large and assertive, potentially “revisionist”, and expansionist, actors, such as could 
be the case in future with China172. Poison pills by weaker powers, such as the potential of 
                                                  
170 But the above does not apply to the neutron bomb! 
171 A clear-cut example of the extreme dangers of a perceived process of alteration of the overall strategic 
balance between nuclear powers is provided to the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world very close 
to a global nuclear catastrophe. 
172 China’s status as a dominant power seems inevitable if the actual pace of its economic and military growth 
is maintained. Its nationalistic-revisionist bias, as revealed by the obsession of annexing Taiwan (since the 
takeover by the Communists of continental China a de facto independent country that belonged to the 
Chinese empire until 1895, and then a Japanese colony until 1945) by force if necessary, and the scramble 
for the contested partition of the oil resources of the China sea, could make its dominance a danger for 
world peace. According to past experience any time new international actors raise forcefully to the scene of 
international politics following successful economic growth, some violent adjustments of the power 
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derailing a conventional war into a nuclear war, with terrible consequences for the stronger 
aggressor, even in case the weaker is defeated (what it may be called the “Samson 
strategy”), could in the future restrain military aggression, albeit not some kind of suicidal 
attacks by those motivated by hate and unrestrained by the prospects of their own 
destruction. But also stronger powers could be tricked in gambling from their position of 
strength, and their delusion could bring about untold consequences on economic and 
demographic progress. 
13. Conclusion 
Our generation has had the privilege of living in a very special period in the history 
of mankind. Never in history have material conditions progressed at the rate to which we 
have become used to in the post-war years, never have the different parts of the globe and 
the different populations become so close, and world population increased at a faster rate. 
Never have overall vital statistics improved in such a substantial way. Still, an important 
part of humanity lives precarious lives under appalling conditions of absolute poverty, but 
its relative share, and in more recent times even its absolute numbers, have steadily 
decreased. In the continuation, and possibly the intensification, of this process may lie the 
hope to eventually overcome world poverty (at least in absolute terms). At the basis of 
those achievements there has been a system of production and of organization (whatever 
its specific variations in the different countries and the different times) that has put to the 
fore the systematic pursuit of technical progress, and its utilization in all aspects of 
economic life, while providing the drive and the incentives to do so. A contributing factor 
accompanying the greatest increase of population and living standards that the world has 
historically known has been the intensification and acceleration of world economic and 
non-economic exchanges (“globalization”). In a world characterized by “capitalist peace” 
and by the refusal of the autarchic tendencies of a recent past, when autarchy was preparing 
the ground to a disastrous world war, any country takes advantage of other countries 
through mutually beneficial voluntary exchanges rather than through conquest and 
exploitation. No alternative better foundation of international economic relations has to 
date been credibly proposed. But this same system has also brought about the utilization of 
technical progress for making increasingly more destructive the technology of warfare. For 
the first time in history mankind has produced the military technology that has the 
potential to lead to its own demise. The danger of global thermonuclear warfare has kept 
the world by and large at relative peace for more than sixty years, quite an unprecedented 
achievement, which has presumably very much contributed to the overall positive results. 
But even if the danger appears to have decreased with the end of the Cold War, the 
potential for large scale destruction remains, and may increase with the spreading of 
nuclear technology in presence of persisting or even increasing nationalistic drives, such as 
by resurging old imperial powers. The increasing perceptions, favoured by globalization, of 
the inequalities and injustices of the world economic order, together with the disruption of 
ancient life styles and privileges, and the recurring scourge of nationalism may put in 
                                                                                                                                                
relations are on the agenda (cf. Easterlin, 1996, p. 6). But, optimistically, one could also envisage an 
alternative path, leading China to become part of a “world security community, a group among whom war 
is literally unthinkable” (Jervis, 2002, p. 1).  The signals that China directs to the outside world are mixed. 
On the one hand there is the diplomatic approach of “China’s peaceful rise” aiming to create good 
neighbouring relations with the other South-East Asian countries, aiming to the creation of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Area, on the other there is the disquieting growth of its military might, whereby 
military expenditures grow at double digit since the nineties. (See Jamestown Foundation, 2009.) 
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jeopardy the future economic progress, conditioned by the persistence of “the capitalist 
peace”. Traditional power politics and dangerous brinkmanship may resurface again. 
Sooner or later we may go back to normality, with nationalism breeding imperialism and 
wars of aggression, but with much enhanced capabilities for destruction. Large scale 
nuclear warfare is always a possibility, especially with the inevitable proliferation of nuclear 
capabilities, with enormous risks for the survival of humanity, even short of Dr. 
Strangelove’s Doomsday Machine. As always has been the case in history, prosperity and 
economic progress are by no means foregone conclusions.  
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX: VITAL STATISTICS 
Table 1A173 Yearly births per 100 population 
 1820 1900 1950 1999 2007 
Italy 3.9 3.3 1.94  0.93 0.85 
West European Average 3.74 3.08 1.83 1 1(EU) 
East European Average     0.99174 
United States 5.52 3.23 2.4 1.44 1.42 
Japan 2.62 3.24 2.81 0.95 0.81 
Russia 4.13 4.8 2.65 0.88 1.09 
Latin American Average   4.19 2.51  
China  4.12 3.7 1.6 1.75 
India  4.58 4.5 2.8 2.27 
Asian Average (without Japan)   4.28 2.3  
African Average   4.92 3.9 3.8 
World   3.74 2.3 2.02 
 
Table 2A. Average Life Expectancy for Groups A and B, 1000–1999175 (years at birth; average for both sexes) 
 1000  1820  1900  1950  1999 
Group A  24  36  46  66  78 
Group B  24  24  26  44  64 
World  24  26  31  49  66 
                                                  
173 Source: Maddison, p. 32 (some of the values refer to slightly different years: see the notes in the 
source); for the year 2007: CIA (2007), and, for the African average, PRB (2007). The data reported in 
the World Factbook for 2007 range from 0.73 (Hong-Kong) to 5.0. It is notable that among the 223 
countries whose data are reported, 9 of the first 10 positions belong to African countries.  
174 Simple average of 17 East-European countries, with values ranging from 8.8 (Bosnia) to 1.2 
(Macedonia). 
175Source: Maddison, p. 33. Group A: Western Europe, Western Offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), and Japan, Group B is the rest of the world. 
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Table 3A.176 Life expectancy at birth 
 1820 1900 1950 2007 
Italy 30 43 66 79.9 
Western Europe 36 46 67 79.5 
Eastern Europe    74.5 
Russia 28 32 65 65.9 
United States 39 47 68 78 
Japan 34 44 61 82 
Latin America 27 35 51 72.8 
China na 24 41 72,9 
India 21 24 32 68.6 
Asia 23 24 40 69 
Africa 23 24 38 52,2 
World 26 31 49 65.8 
More developed 
countries    76.7 
Less developed countries    64.6 
Sources: Maddison, 2006, p. 32; for 2007 U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, at http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbagg. 
                                                  
176In order to understand the implication of the data one should consider that the data concerning life 
expectancy are affected for pre-modern and modern backward societies by very high child mortality 
rates, while adult life expectancy can be much higher. For instance in a demographic regime such as in 
the Mopti district of Mali in 1957-58 with a total fertility rate (average number of live birth per woman) 
of 7.5, life expectancy was 18, but life expectancy at 20 was 48, while in another one, corresponding 
more or less to the demographic regime of 1650-1750 England, with fertility rate 4 life expectancy was 
33, but life expectancy at 20 was 55 (Caldwell and Caldwell, 2003, p.  210). 
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 Table 4A. Some vital statistics from WHO, year 2005177 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate178 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate179 
Infant 
mortality 
rate180 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate181 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate182 
 male female male female male female     
Italy 78 84 71 75 89 46 4 4 3 5 
USA 75 80 67 71 137 81 8 7 4 14 
Japan 79 86 72 78 92 45 4 3 1 10 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
India 62 64 53 54 280 207 74 56 39 540 
Brazil 68 75 57 62 225 118 33 28 13 260 
China 71 74 63 65 155 98 27 23 18 56 
South-
East Asian 
Region 
62 65 54 55 272 207 68 51 35 460 
African 
Region 48 50 40 42 480 438 165 99 40 910 
World 64 68 56 59 233 164 74 51 28 400 
European 
Union183 76 82      5   
Some interesting extreme values (giving the existing range), from CIA Factbook (2007): Birth rate 
(births/1000) 50 (Niger)--7,34 (Hong-Kong); death rate (deaths/1000): 30.35 (Swaziland184)--2.16 (United 
Arab Emirates); Infant Mortality Rate: 184.84 (Angola)--2.3 (Singapore); Life Expectancy at Birth: 83.52 
(Andorra)--32.23 (Swaziland); Total Fertility Rate (children born/woman): 7.38 (Mali)---0.98 (Hong-Kong) 
(1.50 EU). 
 
                                                  
177WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in their assessment, see 
WHO, National Burden of Disease Studies:A Practical Guide. Geneva; WHO, 2001. 
178Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
179 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
180 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
181 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
182Per 100,000 live births. 
183 From CIA (2007). 
184 In the case of Swaziland the very high mortality rate and the the very low life expectancy can be related 
to a HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of nearly 40% (cf. CIA Factbook , 2007).. 
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Table 5A. Some vital statistics of Eastern Europe from WHO, year 2005185 
 
Life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Healthy life 
expectancy at 
birth 
Adult 
mortality 
rate186 
Under 5 
mortality 
rate187 
Infant 
mortality 
rate188 
Neonatal 
mortality 
rate189 
Maternal 
mortality 
rate190 
 male female male female male female     
Albania 69 73 59 63 167 98 18 16 9 55 
Belarus 63 75 57 65 366 133 9 7 3 36 
Bosnia 70 77 62 66 186 88 15 13 10 31 
Bulgaria 69 76 63 67 213 92 15 12 7 32 
Croatia 72 79 64 69 166 65 7 6 5 10 
Czech Rep 73 79 66 71 156 70 4 3 2 9 
Estonia 67 78 59 69 281 100 7 6 4 38 
Hungary 69 77 62 68 256 107 8 6 5 11 
Latvia 65 76 58 68 314 114 10 8 6 61 
Lithuania 65 77 59 68 326 109 9 7 5 19 
Poland191 71 79 63 68 208 79 8 6 5 10 
Romania 68 76 61 65 230 102 19 16 10 58 
Russia 59 72 53 64 470 173 14 11 7 65 
Serbia 70 75 … … 192 98 9 8 … … 
Slovakia 70 78 63 69 201 77 9 7 4 10 
Slovenia 74 81 67 72 152 67 4 3 2 17 
Ukraine 61 73 55 64 403 150 17 13 7 38 
 
                                                  
185World Health Statistics, WHO, 2007. For a definition of the different indicators and the methods used in 
their assessment, see WHO, 2001. 
186 Probability of dying aged 15–60 years per 1000 population. 
187 Probability of dying aged < 5 years per 1000 live births. 
188Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first year of life. 
189 Per 1 000 live births. Mortality in the first 28 days of life. 
190 Per 100,000 live births. 
191 From CIA (2007). 
